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Non-developmental Items (NDI) acquisition programs are enjoying popular
support as faster, cheaper alternatives to full-scale development programs.
Unfortunately, DOD policy with respect to risk management in NDI programs is
lacking. Tailoring DOD risk management policy to support NDI program
management leaves the program manager (PM) much guess-work. A NDI PM's
risk management program cannot reasonably benefit from DOD risk management
guidance, procedures, and risk management tools because they are oriented to
developmental program risks and risk management practices. Missing is any
explicit consideration of the unique risks and risk management requirements in
NDI programs. NDI PMs need more explicit guidance in policy and instruction
regarding NDI risk management in the streamlined, accelerated NDI environment.
This need is brought out in a case study of the Forward Area Air Defense Sensors
Product Office which attempts to implement sound risk management into its NDI
products without the benefit of definitive NDI risk identification, assessment, or
response policy material. A lesson learned is the need for a published Risk
Management Plan as the source of NDI risk management program decisions and
actions. Specific recommendations are contained for inclusion in DOD policy with
respect to NDI risk management.
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Today's era of defense downsizing has the military-
services scrambling to protect research and development funds
and to preserve their acquisition programs. Quality of life,
training, sustainment, and readiness issues continue to siphon
funds away from research, development, and acquisition (RD&A)
programs. The Services and their acquisition program managers
(PMs) are hard-pressed to find ways to reduce development
costs and program duration while optimizing new system
performance and support capabilities. In these lean times,
program management mistakes and problem-plagued acquisition
strategies can often lead to program cancellation. Program
risks must be carefully managed to prevent unanticipated or
poorly planned- for events from making a program vulnerable to
funding cuts or elimination.
To the rescue, or so many hope, comes the Non-
developmental Item (NDI) . NDI system acquisitions give PMs
and the Government greater access to technology. NDI
acquisitions benefit industry by broadening the U.S. Defense
Technology and Industrial Base (DTIB) , increasing the number
of defense contractors available to offer products to the
Department of Defense (DOD) , and providing more extensive
surge capability upon mobilization of the defense industry
(Gansler, p. 110, 1994) . Acquisition strategies based on
these lower- cost, shorter-duration alternatives to the
traditional, full-scale development programs offer the promise
of effective risk mitigation and program success. NDIs
seemingly offer the ideal, low-risk solution of state-of-the-
art technological capabilities that can meet the Services'
urgent mission needs and operational requirements.
NDI program management, however, is not without its own
risks. A PM must tailor a program's risk management to the
unique risks and uncertainties in a NDI system acquisition.
Tailoring is a practice that means modifying the acquisition
process as needed to achieve favorable program results (DOD
Instruction (DODI) 5000.2, p. 2-6, 1991). The concept of
tailoring risk management is valuable as part of the PM' s
program authority. The problems arise in the implementation
of tailored risk management programs, particularly when
considering NDIs.
Risk management in NDI acquisition programs requires more
than tailoring. It demands policy, framework, and format to
assist the program manager. The purpose of using a NDI
acquisition strategy is to simplify and speed the acquisition
process to meet a program's, and ultimately, the soldier's
needs. NDI acquisition is an approach that requires
supportive risk management policy structure, rather than
implicit expectations of tailoring, to fulfill its promise of
simple, rapid, and reduced- risk acquisitions.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to examine risk
management in NDI acquisition programs. It will consist of
DOD risk management and NDI policy reviews from an Army air
defender's point of view. Risk management concepts and
practices will be explored first to set the stage for defense
risk management. DOD risk management policies will be
assessed to determine their applicability and support of NDI
risk management programs. This thesis will then use the
Ground Based Sensor (GBS) and the Light and Special Division
Interim Sensor (LSDIS) acquisitions managed by the Forward
Area Air Defense (FAAD) Sensors Program Office to demonstrate
how risk management is currently practiced by an Air Defense
Artillery (ADA) systems program office. The result of this
examination will be recommendations for risk management
policies and processes focused on NDI system acquisitions.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question of this thesis is:
How does DOD risk management policy address NDI acquisitions
and how does it support NDI acquisition programs such the
Forward Area Air Defense Early Warning Sensors Program?
Subsidiary Research Questions supporting this issue are:
1. What is risk management?
2
.
What are the current DOD and Army risk management
policies and how do they address NDI acquisitions?
3. What are the risks associated with NDI acquisitions?
4. What were the risks involved with the GBS and LSDIS
tactical early warning sensor acquisitions?
5 What was the risk management approach for GBS and
LSDIS and how consistent was the FAAD Sensor program's
risk management effort in complying with DOD and Army
risk management policies? What problems were
encountered in complying with risk management
policies?
6 . What improvements can be made to DOD risk management
policy to enhance NDI risk management planning and
execution in future NDI acquisitions?
D. SCOPE
This thesis encompasses risk management policy as it
applies to NDI acquisitions. It examines the current
structure of risk management in DOD and the U.S. Army. It
considers the unique uncertainties and risk in NDI programs.
It explores whether the intent of using NDI acquisitions as a
risk management measure accomplishes its purpose. It focuses
on the efforts of a NDI Air Defense system program management
office (PMO) to manage its program and its program risks in an
era of scarce resources and broad risk management policy. It
is not meant to be a technical examination of the GBS or LSDIS
systems capabilities nor a comprehensive evaluation of their
acquisition strategies or plans. It will explore the
treatment of aspects of risk within those documents but will
not cover classified material. This research does not contain
material from the Army's risk management handbook (Department
of the Army Pamphlet 70-2) scheduled to be published in
February 1995. This examination assumes a working knowledge
of a system acquisition life cycle.
E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODS
The literature search to support this effort is driven by
first-hand training experiences by the thesis author. The
starting point for this analysis comes from the Defense
Systems Management College (DSMC) Risk Management, NDI
Acquisition, Systems Engineering, and Commercial Practices
publications, ADA Magazine articles on GBS and LSDIS, Program
Manager Magazine articles on risk management, and the Air
Force Acquisition Model (AFAM) materials relating to risk
management. This is complemented by the Program Management
Institute's (PMI) guidelines for commercial program risk
management which provide developed risk management theory.
Journal articles and technical reports examining risk
management and NDI acquisitions were obtained from the Defense
Logistics Systems Information Exchange (DLSIE) and the Defense
Technical Information Center (DTIC) . The FAAD Sensors Program
Office, Assistant Program Executive Office for ADA
Integration, and the Contracting Directorate at Redstone
Arsenal, Alabama provided FAAD Sensors acquisition and risk
management documents and data.* The TRADOC Systems Manager
(TSM) for Early Warning Sensors and the Directorate for Combat
Developments (DCD) at Ft. Bliss, Texas assisted by providing
material on GBS and LSDIS fielding.
The risk management materials for this research are
augmented with face -to -face interviews with experts at
Redstone Arsenal and Fort Bliss working with GBS and LSDIS
acquisitions. Additional data came from telephone discussions
with those same experts. The interviews solicited views and
opinions on the GBS and LSDIS NDI acquisition strategies,
their risk management programs, issues affecting NDI
acquisitions, and their associated risks. Thesis travel
occurred 14-18 June 1994 to conduct the personal interviews
and discussions with these sources.
The method this thesis employs is to familiarize the
reader with risk management and NDI concepts and the DOD
policies pertaining to them. It includes a review of existing
risk management policies and procedures published and cited by
defense sources. It progresses to a specific NDI program case
analysis. DOD and Army risk management guidelines are
examined through the case study of two ADA NDI acquisitions.
The case reviews how DOD policy was implemented and to what
extent the policy supports NDI acquisition program managers.
The steps used to research and analyze this thesis topic
consist of the following:
1. A familiarization and study of risk management
concepts using the Program Management Institute's body
of knowledge pertaining to project risk management.
2. An examination of defense risk management and risk
management policy. It is complemented by the DSMC
publication on risk management. DOD Acquisition
policy from the 5000. -series and Army risk management
regulations provide sources for this step.
3 . An assessment of the support and effect of these
policies on NDI program management using the DSMC
publication on NDI acquistions and the above-mentioned
references
.
4. An assessment of tailoring developmental risk
management policy in support of NDI acquisition programs
.
An analysis of a case. The case examines the
experience of the FAAD Sensors PMO using DOD risk
management policies and practices in its program
management of the GBS and LSDIS. The basis for this
case is face -to- face and telephone interviews with
past and present FAAD Sensors officials using a
prepared set of questions on the FAAD Sensors program
and risk management.
Instruments of measurement for this thesis are
templates from DOD Publication 4245. 7-M, the risk
assessment formats found in DOD 5000. 2 -M, and the risk
management plan cited -in the DSMC risk management
publication. A dendritic diagram will depict the
differences in developmental item and NDI risk
management policy. This may be valuable not only to
the GBS and LSDIS case but for NDI acquisition
programs overall
.
Based on case analysis and policy assessment, a series
of recommendations and conclusions emerge to aid
future NDI PMs. The usefulness of NDI -based risk
templates and NDI -oriented risk management policy will
be included as the basis for these recommendations.
F. DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS
Definitions and acronyms common to DOD, the U.S. Army,
and civilian program management are noted throughout this
thesis.
G. CHAPTER OUTLINE
This thesis investigates the use of risk management
programs and policies for NDI acquisitions.
Chapter I introduces the background and focus of
research. It examines today's constrained resources which
complicate the acquisition and environment and support the
appeal of NDI solutions. It considers the incentives for risk
management and the unforgiving acquisition climate in which
risk management has become a must.
Chapter II serves as an overview to define and describe
risk and risk management concepts . This risk management
"primer", based on the PMI body of knowledge, then narrows to
consider defense -unique details of risk management. It
introduces current risk management policy at both DOD and Army
level and lays out the general risk management process
prescribed for program offices.
Chapter III examines the NDI alternative to full scale
development. It discusses the acquisition and risk management
policy that is expected to support NDI system acquisition
management. It includes consideration of the tailoring
involved in NDI risk management. It examines the risks unique
to pursuing NDI acquisitions.
Chapter IV relates the events that created the current
absence of Early Warning Network (EWN) systems (i.e. GBS and
LSDIS) in ADA units. The risks in the GBS and LSDIS
acquisitions may or may not be directly associated with the
four year delay witnessed in providing initial sensor systems
to the users . It provides an overview of the two sensors and
considers the risks facing the GBS and LSDIS systems. It
reviews the risk management approach for each sensor and
presents challenges in mitigating NDI risks using
developmental item-based policy, practices, and risk
management tools such as the templates found in DOD 4245. 7-M.
Chapter V analyzes DOD NDI risk management policy and
guidelines. This chapter considers the challenges and
potential solutions for effective NDI risk management based on
available risk management tools. The tools considered are the
DOD 4245. 7-M templates and a NDI risk management plan.
Chapter VI makes recommendations and proposes
improvements in the content, value, and effectiveness of DOD
NDI risk management policies and guidelines for future
programs. These emerge from the application of lessons in the
FAAD Sensors case and DOD policy review. The recommendations
consist of revisions to risk management policies and practices
in NDI acquisitions.
II. RISK MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW
A. PURPOSE
This chapter introduces risk and risk management
concepts. This risk management "primer" uses the Program
Management Institute's (PMI) body of knowledge on risk
management as the source of this basic overview. The PMI
approach is representative of the general body of knowledge
concerning risk and risk management that may be found in
business and industry today. DSMC risk management concepts
are subsequently introduced. The chapter then presents DOD
and U.S. Army risk management policy which acts as guidance
for PMs as they structure their risk management programs.
B. THE DEFINITION OF RISK
What is risk? Before answering this, it is important to
understand the role of uncertainty. Uncertainty represents
the set of all possible outcomes that are either favorable
(opportunities) or unfavorable (risks) . 1 The goal of risk
management is to move uncertainties in an acquisition program
away from the risk end of the uncertainty spectrum and towards
the opportunities end.
With this understanding of uncertainty, risk is defined
as the cumulative probability of uncertain occurrences
adversely affecting a program's objectives. Risk itself
consists of three risk factors. These are:
1. Risk Events . These are specific occurrences
that can hurt progress in a program. The consequences of
these negative events are described predominantly in terms of
scope, quality, time, and cost objectives or goals:
a. Scope Risks are changes in scope to meet
1 The material presented in this chapter, sections B-F
are referenced from Wideman, p. 1-2 to p.B-1, 1992 except as
noted.
program objectives (e.g. regulatory or work breakdown
structure changes) . These risks include both ill -defined
program pla.n.3 and requirements.
b. Quality Risks are performance or technical
failures. These risks include poor quality assurance and poor
workmanship.
c. Schedule Risks are failures in meeting time
estimates. These risks consist of poor, premature, or
optimistic time estimates, scope changes, and/or accelerated
fielding requirements
.
d. Cost Risks are failures to achieve desired
budget targets. These risks consist of poor, premature, or
optimistic cost estimates and/or inadequate cost controls.
The type of acquisition program determines the type of
possible risk events witnessed and their influence on a
program. Most risks affect more than one program objective
with the predominance of risk events affecting the schedule
and cost program objectives.
2. Risk Probability . This is the likelihood of
occurrence of each of the risk events
.
3. Amount at Stake . This represents the severity
of the consequences if a particular risk event occurs.
C. RISK MANAGEMENT
Risk management is "the art and science of identifying,
assessing, and responding to project risk throughout the life
of a project and in the best interests of its objectives"
(Wideman, p. II-3, 1992). Risk management is a continuous,
integrated process conducted throughout the life of an
acquisition program. Its goals are the identification of
program risk and the development of risk management strategies
to minimize or avoid those risks. Risk management's intent is
to aid proactive decision-making through anticipatory planning
as opposed to crisis decisionmaking.
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D. IMPLEMENTING RISK MANAGEMENT
A program office implements risk management to assise
planning and decisionmaking. In doing so, uncertainty, risk,
and the amount at stake can be reduced to manageable levels
throughout the program life.
Risk management in business stresses four phases:
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Wideman, Chapter III, 1992)
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1. Program Risk Identification
Risk identification is the identification of specific
characteristics thought to contribute to uncertainty in
program objectives (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency,
p. 6, 1983) . This first phase seeks to identify all the
possible risks which may significantly impact a program's
success. Examples of sources of risk are: unanticipated
Government intervention, unpredicted changes or shifts in
economic markets, inappropriate program structure, scheduling
delays, unanticipated resource problems, changes in
technology, changes in performance requirements or design,
increased technical complexity, and contractual difficulties
evolving from the type of contract or data rights issues.
Risk identification requires PMs to be familiar with the
program's scope, product, and objectives. Risks are matched
to the program objectives they affect and then screened by
their type and source. Identification should be completed
early in a program's life to facilitate informed
decisionmaking and provide risk early warning signals. PMs
can identify sources of risk and understand them better using
a multi-functional team to examine program details and
determine their risks and uncertainties. These can then
provide PMs initial risk estimates.
2. Program Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is the "examination of program elements,
using experts, in order to synthesize a model... (it) is a
means of reducing the knowledge of program elements to
quantitative expressions of uncertainty" (DSMC, p. II-2,
1983) . This phase seeks to analyze the individual elements
that create uncertainty or problems, determine the
12
relationships among those elements, and then formulate a model
to study the problem (Ingalls, p. 28, 1983) . Quantification
then follows to develop mathematical descriptions of those
relationships posed in the model.
Risk assessment consists of two primary steps: assessing
and assigning probabilities to risk events and analyzing the
consequences on the project. Assessment includes assigning
probabilities to undesired or unfavorable events (risks) and
examining their affect on program objectives. This again can
effectively be done using a multifunctional team. A risk
assessment team rates program risks by type, impact, and
probability of occurrence using subjective or quantitative
estimates. Risk ratings normally consist of low, medium, and
high based on their severity of impact. Risk assessment
treats risks as probabilities of unfavorable events that occur
within the range of total success and total failure. This
range establishes a risk baseline and the ability to benchmark
a program's risk status against program objectives over a
program's life.
Quantitative risk assessment is called risk analysis. It
models and quantifies risk events and their impact on program
objectives. Analysis concentrates primarily on medium- and
high- rated program risks with the highest likelihood of
occurrence. Contingency allowances, such as management
reserves, cover risks with lower severity. Together, risk
assessment and the risk analysis which supports it provide a
risk profile or picture that the PM can use to make informed
program decisions.
Risk analysis requires the PM to estimate the degree of
uncertainty expected early in a program. This may be done
using probability distributions, probability tree diagrams,
modeling, or sensitivity analysis (as opposed to simply using
subjective assessment or "gut feeling"). Risk analysis
modeling techniques that support this phase include
13*
probability distribution analysis, the Delphi Method, Monte
Carlo simulations, and decision theory.
Risk analysis should accompany risk assessment early in
a program's life cycle and can be tailored to the program. It
is an iterative, continuous cycle used to establish or update
the risk baseline. Its value is as an integral part of
program management planning.
3 . Risk Response
Risk response is program manager actions and strategy
initiated once risks have been identified and assessed. This
phase establishes strategies to effectively handle risk.
Responses include:
1. Acceptance . Management takes no action after
recognition (management responds by adjusting
operations or modifying objectives)
.
2. Avoidance. Management takes proactive steps, makes
contingency plans, or selects lower- risk alternatives.
3. Reduction/Minimization . Management uses alternative
approaches such as workarounds or collection of data
and information to facilitate contingency planning.
4. Sharing . Management shares risk through joint
agreements or contract agreements.
5. Transfer . Management deflects risk via a contract
clause, liability or loss insurance, or warranties.
6. Absorption . Management relies on contingency
allowances or reserves.
14
7. A combination of the above methods.
Program managers can hold periodic reviews to monitor
changes in program risks and update proposed responses
.
4. Risk Data Collection, Application, and
Documentation
This final risk management phase builds a reliable
database to allow continued risk evaluations for current
programs and as reference sources for future programs. Risk
management data sources are established through historical
databases, current databases, and post -program reviews and
archives. These aid the estimation, comparison, updating, and
information exchange needs of the program manager. Data-
building facilitates and simplifies risk and program decisions
particularly when multifunctional teaming and high turnover
prevail in a program office.
Risk management is a continuous, iterative process
conducted throughout the lifecycle of a system's acquisition.
Managing the uncertainties of a program and the consequences
of unfavorable events is a difficult task. DOD faces its own
acquisition risks. Its risk management approach is the focus
of the next section.
E. RISK MANAGEMENT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
1. Risk Definition
DOD defines risk somewhat differently from the definition
presented earlier. The DOD definition considers subjectivity
and impacts made on program objectives rather than simply
considering its impact on the whole program. It defines risk
as "a subjective assessment made regarding the likelihood or
15
probability of not achieving a specific objective by the time
established with the resources provided or requested" (DODI
5000.2, p. 15-15, 1991) . Risk is characterized in the
following ways: 2
a. Technical Risk . This is performance -based risk
in the development of a new design for better performance or
with new constraints on existing performance. It includes
operational capability, reliability, and producibility.
Examples relating to technical risk are development and design
based on unproven technologies, requirements changes, and/or
configuration changes.
b. Supportability Risk . This is performance -based
risk in fielding and providing maintenance support to new
systems. It results from technical or programmatic risks.
Examples include unforeseen training requirements, and/or
failure to achieve reliability, availability, and
maintainability requirements.
(Technical and Supportability Risk appear to correspond
to Performance Risk defined in Section B)
.
c. Programmatic Risk . This is environment -based
risk from the impact of events beyond a PM' s control . These
include higher level decisions and/or turbulence introduced
from outside the program (e.g. Congress) and resource changes
that can influence program success. Additional examples are
material and personnel shortages or turbulence, contractor
instability, and/or funding changes.
(Programmatic Risk appears to correspond to Scope Risk
defined in Section B)
.
d. Cost Risk . This is the risk of cost projections
not being realistic or of the program not progressing
efficiently to meet established cost objectives. This often
2 The material in sections E-H is referenced from DSMC's
Risk Management Concepts and Guidance, p. 3 -4 to p.C-7, 1989
except where noted.
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results from sensitivity to technical, supportability, or
programmatic risks. Examples are increased overhead rates and
cost estimation errors.
e. Schedule Risk . This is the risk of schedule
estimates being too optimistic or of the program not
developing effectively to achieve established baselines. This
often results from sensitivity to technical, cost,
supportability, or programmatic risks. Examples include
problems resulting from concurrent development and production
and schedule estimation errors.
According to the DSMC, technical, supportability, and
programmatic risks act as sources of risk while cost and
schedule risks are indicators of those sources of unfavorable
events. These five types of risk act interdependently to
affect a program's performance.
2. Risk Management
DOD defines risk management as "a systematic approach to
identifying, analyzing, and controlling areas or events with
a potential for causing unwanted change. It is an integral
part of the overall program management effort" (PM Notebook,
p. 4. 5-3, 1992). This definition differs from the business
definition in that it stresses a systematic approach rather
than "art and science". DODI 5000.2 adds that these actions
are taken to bring risk "to an acceptable level in selected
areas (e.g. cost, schedule, technical, producibility, etc.)
and the total program (DODI 5000.2, p. 15-15, 1989). Risk
management identifies and evaluates the vulnerable areas of a
program. Its purpose is to provide a means of comparing risk
management performance to a standard and tracking risk- related
information.
17
3 . The Defense Risk Management Process
A PM' s risk management process sets objectives and
repeatedly assesses the program for obstacles preventing those
objectives from being attained. The DOD risk management
process is similar to the basic process described earlier. It
requires that criteria or a set of standards with which to
judge successful risk assessment and mitigation be established
early in the program's life. The DOD process consists of a
different set of phases from the basic process. It consists
of planning, assessing, analyzing, and handling risk (see
Figure 2) . This structure, like the basic approach, considers
both internal and external circumstances affecting a program's
objectives. It likewise allows the PM to formulate
alternative courses of action and to make rational decisions
on monitoring and controlling the outcomes of program events.
The four defense risk management process components are:
a. Risk Planning . This first phase defines the
program's present and future risks. This establishes the
need, purpose, and requirements* for managing particular risks
within a program to eliminate, minimize, or contain them. Risk
identification in this phase gives a "plain English"
description of risk events that can prevent program goals from
being achieved. The program's Work Breakdown Structure is a
favorite tool to provide a risk identification, rating, and
analysis structure. Risk rating schemes include lessons
learned, expert interviews, baselines, templates, analogy
comparisons, program document evaluations, technology
evaluations, and contractor risk evaluations. This phase
corresponds with the business Risk Identification phase.
b. Risk Assessment . This is the examination of a
program objective and assessment of those risk events posing
potential problems. Risk ratings and a risk baseline similar
to those described earlier give PMs a means of datermining a
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Figure 2 The DOD Risk Management Process (Source: DSMC Risk
Management Concepts and Guidance, Chapter 5, 19 89)
program's risk status. The combination of assessment and
analysis shows points in a program where the consequences of
risk are likely to occur, their severity, and what drives
them. The DOD 4245. 7-M risk templates are common DOD tools
for assessing program risk. Risk quantification begins in
this phase. Whereas business groups risk assessment and risk
analysis together, the defense risk management process
separates risk assessment and risk analysis.
c. Risk Analysis . Risk analysis is an examination
of the changes in consequences caused by changes to risk input
variables. Analytical and quantitative methods are used to
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demonstrate the potential impacts of risk consequences on a
program. These methods include simulations, network models
(PERT, CPM) , cumulative probability distributions, life cycle
cost programs, and quick reaction modeling. These tools allow
a PM to develop risk-handling options and techniques.
Risk analysis provides valuable outputs. One example of
these is the watchlist (PM Notebook, p. 4. 5-4, 1992). A
watchlist is a signalling mechanism for risk-based events or
outcomes. The list consists of areas of risk, their expected
impacts, and ways to detect and manage each prioritized risk
area. It acts as a worksheet to track risk management
progress and to show where the PM can make acceptable risk-
program performance tradeoffs.
d. Risk-Handling . Handling risk areas
completes the DOD version of the risk management process.
This is the formulation of management options to control or
minimize areas of risk. DOD risk-handling measures are
categorized as avoidance, control and prevention, assumption
of consequences, transfer of responsibility, and knowledge and
research. Risk control processes are the most common risk-
handling measures. They consist of event-based, Government
reviews and audits paralleled by contractor systematic
analyses, reviews, and tests. Such continuous monitoring and
corrective actions must be coordinated and integrated into
program plans and documents . This phase corresponds to the
business phases of Risk Response and Risk Documentation.
The DOD risk management process is sequential and
continuous much like the risk management process described
earlier. Risk management evaluates what is achievable against
what is planned; identifies risk areas using lessons learned,
risk templates, work breakdown structures, and expert
interviews; rates and quantifies risks; analyzes their
severity of impact on program completion; and offers risk-
handling options and tools. Once risk handling options are
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implemented, the PM should document risk areas for future
programs' benefit. A means of documenting the PM's risk
management program is through the publication of a risk
management plan.
F. DOD RISK MANAGEMENT POLICIES
Risk management policies for acquisition programs are
described in the DOD 5000 -series policies. The purpose of the
5000 -series is to provide acquisition program policy,
regulations, instructions, and format for PMs - to include
their risk management programs. DOD Directive (DODD) 5000.1
is the first authority for risk management policy. According
to DODD 5000.1:
Program risks and risk management plans shall be
explicitly assessed at each milestone decision
point prior to granting approval to the next
acquisition phase. This includes: early
identification of critical parameters, technology
demonstrations to reduce risk, test and evaluation
to determine system maturity and identify risks,
contractor risk plans and trade-offs to keep risk
at acceptable levels.
The Directive points out that risk assessment and
reduction plans are required ^as part of the acquisition
process to ensure sound program management decisions (DODD
5000.1, p. 1-5, 1991)
.
DODI 5000.2 follows DODD 5000.1 with more detailed
guidance on managing risk. DODI 5000.2 Part 5B, published 1
February 1991 states:
A risk management program shall be established for
each acquisition program to identify and control
performance, cost, and schedule risks using the
areas of risk identified in DOD 4245. 7-M. The risk
management program must include provisions for
eliminating these risks or reducing them to
acceptable levels. Industry participation in risk
management is essential.
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DOD 4245. 7-M is a document containing risk management
templates. These templates are tools for assessing and
reducing program risks.
DODI 5000.2 elaborates on risk management in Part 5B,
Change 1, dated 26 February 1993. It states "risks, risk
reduction measures, rationale, and assumptions made in
assigning risk ratings, and alternative acquisition strategies
will be explicitly assessed at each milestone decision point."
Finally, the 5000. 2 -M reference for acquisition
documentation and formats addresses the risk management area.
DOD 5000. 2 -M indicates "The Integrated Program Summary (IPS)
for each milestone, shall assess the risks with respect to the
threat, technology, design, and engineering support,
manufacturing, cost and schedule. The IPS shall summarize the
actions being taken to mitigate those risks."
G. U.S. ARMY RISK MANAGEMENT POLICIES
U.S. Army leadership in and treatment of risk management
in research, development, and acquisition programs began in
1970 (Muldrow, p. 28, 1985) . In DA PAM 11-2, Research and
Development Cost Guide for Army Material Systems (May 1976)
,
paragraph 3.5, PMs are encouraged to manage risks by treating
costs as ranges rather than point estimates. The Army
Development Acquisition and Readiness Command (now known as
the Army Material Command) Regulation, DARCOM-R 11- 1 (April
1976) on systems analysis, focuses extensively on risk
analysis guidelines. Appendix D of this DARCOM-R prescribes
its Decision Risk Analysis Guidelines for PMs as follows:
1. a. Define the problem
b. Establish the decisionmakers' preferences for
trade-offs between cost, schedule, and/or performance




4. Collect the data
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5.
Determine the program risks
6. Select the best alternatives
7. Perform sensitivity analysis
8. Communicate the results
These steps are consistent with guidelines suggested in
both the DSMC's risk management publication and the PMI body
of knowledge.
H. SUMMARY
Through the DODD 5000.1 and DODI 5000.2, the Defense
Department provides risk management material and guidance.
The 5000 -series was intended to communicate risk management
policy and guidelines for all PMs
.
The problem with DOD risk management policy is that
policy and guidelines written for the Cold War defense
environment was oriented toward full-scale, developmental
programs and the five -phase acquisition cycle. NDI are the
exception to these rules. Their risk management programs must
be tailored because no explicit NDI risk management exists.
The new dimension of risk management of NDI acquisitions, the
DOD policies concerned, and the difficulties involved are the
focus of the next chapter.
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III. RISK MANAGEMENT IN NDI ACQUISITIONS
A. PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND
This chapter examines NDI acquisitions and the conditions
that make NDI acquisition strategies attractive. It defines
what NDIs are and are not, their advantages and disadvantages,
and the acquisition policies governing them. This sets the
stage to study how DOD risk management policies and practices
address NDIs and support the PM managing a NDI acquisition
program.
Commercial business and DOD have new roles and face new
trends compared to those of the Cold War status quo. During
the Cold War, the defense establishment drove the pace of
technological innovation. Several trends have since shaped
new roles (Borrus, p. 41, 1990) . First, civilian technology no
longer trails military technology as it did for several
decades during the Cold War era. Next, commercial production
features greater quality and efficiencies in flexible
manufacturing, multiple product lines, just- in- time
inventories, and lower volume production runs. Finally, many
critical defense technologies have considerable overlap with
commercial technologies. 3 The need to modernize and retain
state-of-the-art capabilities for military forces in an era of
capped military spending supports the purchase of commercial
products for military use. The primary means of acquiring and
fielding these products is with NDIs.
B. THE DEFINITION OF NDI
The basic definition of NDI is "a broad term covering
material available from a variety of sources, with little or
no development effort required by the government" (DSMC NDI
3 The material in this chapter references the DSMC NDI
Acquisition Guide, p.xiii to p. 78, 1992 except as indicated.
25
Acquisition Guide, p. 3, 1992). NDIs are an option for
fielding systems more quickly and cheaply than with a new,
developmental item. NDI acquisition strategies look to
commercial vendors and federal, state, local, and foreign
governments as sources for the desired item. They also
consider any commercial item in design, development, and/or
production but not yet available for commercial use (Prueitt,
1994) .
The U.S. Congress defines a NDI as:
1. Any item available in the commercial marketplace.
2. Any previously developed item in use by the U.S
Government or cooperating foreign governments.
3 . Any item of supply needing only minor modifications to
meet DOD requirements.
The military services define NDIs more specifically. The
Army version distinguishes NDI in three categories (Quindlen,
p. 53, 1989)
:
1. Category A (Basic NDI) -: Off-the-shelf items to be
used in the same environment for which items were
designed with little or no development or modification
required.
Category B (NDI Adaptation) : Off-the-shelf items to be
used in an environment different than that for which
the items were designed with some development
required. These include products requiring
hardening, strengthening and/or related modifications
.
This category is sometimes referred to as "Ruggedized
NDI" .
3. Category C (NDI Integration) : Integration of existing
componentry and the essential engineering effort to
accomplish systems integration with research and
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development to integrate systems . This category is
sometimes labelled "Militarized NDI".
Confusion sometimes arises in distinguishing a NDI from
a commercial-off- the- shelf (COTS) item. A COTS item makes up
only a portion of DOD- classified NDIs . COTS items are
commercial hardware/software items not modified by the
government, items that are in the commercial inventory or
production, that have proved their performance in a similar
environment, that have an existing support structure, have an
internal support structure, have an internal configuration
that flows with commercial changes and generally are
integrated with other hardware/software items to become part
of a system or subsystem capability.
C. USING NDI FOR REDUCING PROGRAM RISKS
NDIs have become increasingly important in equipping our
services. NDI acquisitions are more prevalent as an
alternative to costly, lengthy, and more risky developmental
programs. The lower risks commonly associated with cost,
schedule, and technical performance make NDI acquisitions
politically and programmatically popular.
NDIs are considered a means of mitigating program risks.
Risk mitigation involves the assessment and response
activities of risk management which were outlined in the
previous chapter. Risk mitigation is implemented through the
shortened or eliminated Demonstration and Validation (DEMVAL)
Phase and Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD)
Phase of the NDI acquisition cycle. The streamlined NDI
acquisition cycle reduces cost and schedule risks. However,
NDI acquisitions do not eliminate risk but may in fact
introduce new, significant risks. These risks will be
examined shortly.
An effective NDI acquisition program must fulfill the
Service's needs by fielding mature technology that preserves
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combat readiness while satisfying popular expectations. The
three features which attract substantial DOD and Congressional
popular support to NDI alternatives but which challenge the PM
are:
1. Meeting user requirements based on available
commercial market solutions.
2. Tailoring user requirements to suit NDI acquisition
strategies while avoiding "goldplating"
.
3. Opening up greater access to state-of-the-art
technology for DOD while keeping pace with changing threats,
emerging technologies, and innovative combat systems.
To DOD and Congressional decisionmakers, NDIs appear to
be a low- risk approach for meeting the Services' needs and
requirements. The danger, however, is in forcing NDI
solutions on PMs and their customers (the user community)
,
when those NDI neither meet requirements nor transition
effectively from commercial to battlefield environments.
D. NDI BENEFITS AND POTENTIAL RISKS
1. Benefits
NDI acquisitions have many benefits which make the
transition of commercial technology to military use a popular
course of action. A NDI acquisition provides an existing or
modified system to meet a stated requirement in a cost-
effective and timely manner. The benefits NDIs offer are:
Time
Decreased acquisition cycles, shorter procurement
lead times, and reduced testing requirements often result in





Minimized research and development costs reduce
expected lifecycle costs. These costs savings stem from using
commercial specifications and the competitive pricing inherent
in commercial markets (Cain, p. 23, 1993)
c. Technical Performance
State-of-the-art technology from the commercial
marketplace meets operational requirements with limited design
and development. NDI programs introduce the acquisition of
mature technologies, with validated and established production
techniques, and high quality standards. Reliability,
availability, and maintainability (RAM) , and supportability
data are already established as part of commercial testing and
market demands (Garcia, p. 8, 1991).
d. Risk Reduction
Risks to development costs, program duration, and
leading edge technical performance are decreased. NDI limits
risks with an established cost structure, minimized production
start-up costs with currently operating production lines,
economies of scale where the Government is not the sole
customer, and the competitive pressures of commercial markets





Simplified contracts often result from procurement
of established products. The increased use of Fixed-Price-






























Figure 3 Notional Developmental and Non- developmental Item
Timelines (Source: Vandeviere, Chapter 2, 1994)
contractors' shoulders while reducing Government risk (GAO, p.
11, 1989) .
2. Potential Risks
A developmental item PM traditionally faces cost,
schedule, performance, supportability, and programmatic risks
whereas the NDI PM' s program risks are more unique . NDIs
typically reduce cost and schedule risks. The risks described
below affect the technical performance, supportability, and
programmatic objectives in a NDI program. In reviewing the
literature, the author has determined that the following five
areas are the most pressing potential risks facing NDI
acquisition programs: Requirements, NDI Acquisition Management
Environment, Specifications and Standards, Test and
Evaluation, and Integrated Logistics Support. If not properly
addressed, these risks may eas'ily affect cost and schedule




"Initial (Operational) Requirements Documents (ORD)
are developed without careful consideration of what is
currently available as NDI" (DSMC NDI Acquisition Guide, p.
14, 1992). Requirements risks . surface when the operational
community develops an ORD focused entirely on operational
need, independent of market solutions available to meet those
needs . NDI requirements risk can arise from users developing
an ORD based on available commercial technology rather than
available commercial products. The user proceeds to mix and
match the desired functions or capabilities of several
products into one ORD when no existing item can meet user
requirements without making extensive modifications. On the
other hand, the user may accept an available NDI solution
which does not strictly comply with all the specified
requirements
.
Requirements risk affects all of a program's
objectives. This risk in NDI acquisitions often indicates a
lack of flexibility in ORD development. The risk grows when
the requirements generation process does not include the PM.
The PM' s responsibility, as the material developer, is to
respond to user needs but to be fully conscious of technical
risks, af fordability constraints, and schedule impacts. The
user's responsibility is to be realistic in stated
requirements, weigh proven capability and rapid deployment
benefits against performance limitations, and negotiate
acceptable trade-offs with the PM. Too often these
responsibilities are not integrated or communicated.
Requirements risk affects a user's desire or ability to back
off of validated ORD requirements. When minor modifications
are pursued to comply with stated requirements, the NDI may
take on extensive and costly developmental item
characteristics and defeat the purpose of the NDI acquisition
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strategy (Cain, p. 24, 1993) .
Insufficient or ineffective market analysis
accentuates the problem. Market analysis may not be detailed
enough to identify technologies and potential contractors.
The user/PM team then cannot evaluate the strengths of a NDI
acquisition strategy compared to a developmental one. Market
analysis, when properly used, contains both broadly- scoped
market surveillance to canvas technologies and product
developments and the narrower- focused market investigation
used to determine what technology or products meet user needs.
Insufficient commitment of effort and resources to teaming and
market analysis leads the user and PM to either neglect
potential alternatives or falsely conclude that no commercial
alternative exists to fulfill user requirements.
Jb. NDI Acquisition Management Environment
The NDI acquisition management environment confronts
the PM with the complexities of multiple stakeholders (DOD,
Congress, the Service, and the user) , internal and external
perceptions and attitudes (cultural resistance) towards NDIs,
commercial standards and practices, developmental ly- based
paperwork requirements, audits, and inspections, and mistrust
among the NDI acquisition participants. These elements create
programmatic risks for the PM.
The successful achievement of cost, schedule,
performance, and supportability "objectives depends on the PM's
interaction and effective teaming with the prime contractor as
well as with the user community. Trade-offs between ORD- based
requirements and cost and schedule constraints on the program
may become sources of conflict. The Government's desire to
buy as opposed to the contractor's unwillingness to provide
adequate technical data may become a major source of friction.
The contractor's unwillingness to allow quality control
32
oversight and qualification of its manufacturing and
production processes may contribute to a contentious
relationship with the PM and the Government. NDI performance
expectations may not be realistic to both parties. Lack of
communication before and after program reviews may prevent
clearly- defined agreements and changes from being implemented
during the NDI acquisition cycle. With the shortened NDI
acquisition cycles, the communication and feedback loops may
not develop and mature. The results may become mistrust and
inappropriate trade-off decisions.
NDI acquisition success requires changing
traditional, sometimes antagonistic procurement mindsets in
the acquisition and user communities. The NDI environment may
not be conducive to effective communication, coordination, and
cooperation. The willingness to objectively assess and choose
between the best technology available and a full-scale
development start-up requires open-minded acquisition team
members. The team members' responsiveness to new acquisition
strategies requires overcoming ingrained developmental program
biases. Such an atmosphere may require extensive training and
education (Garcia, p. 26, 1991)
.
Political and defense interests may drive an
acquisition towards a NDI acquisition strategy when it is not
appropriate. This confines the PM' s efforts to the "NDI box
(with) NDI boundaries and NDI criteria" when that NDI option
may not meet the user's requirements. The appeal of NDIs may
foster "zero defects" expectations whereby few, if any,
program or contractual problems will be accepted, especially
if the user has experienced previous acquisition program
failures. Given constrained budget and resource environments,
programming and budgeting decisions from outside the PM'
s
sphere of influence may create programmatic risks themselves.
Lastly, NDI streamlining may ignore useful development
program management tools such as program reviews and design
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reviews. These tools may be ignored to meet accelerated
schedules and to minimize or streamline the commitment of
resources, funds, and personnel.
c. Specifications and Standards
Specifications and standards serve as a means of
requirements verification in a product's design and
development but they contribute to technical performance risks
in a program. The risk in specifications and standards (S&S)
concerns the use of military as opposed to commercial S&S.
Military specifications (MILSPECS) and military
standards (MILSTDS) draw criticism from industry as being
excessively demanding, outdated, incompatible with NDIs, and
unnecessary in light of the detail presently existing in
commercial item descriptions (CIDs) . In some cases such as
nuclear delivery systems, strict MILSPECS and MILSTDS are
justifiable, but the tendency is to go beyond performance
(form, fit, and function) requirements to describe the design
and manufacturing processes themselves. The S&S risks
materialize in contract prices, timeliness, access, and
manufacturing efficiency, all of which may be lost to the
contractor and the user if MILSPECS and MILSTDS are required
in product design, development, and manufacturing.
The challenge for NDI 'PMs is to leave the safety and
security of MILSPECS and MILSTDS and to use CIDs and
commercial standards. A NDI acquisition strategy encourages
acquisition agencies to break inclinations to "cling to the
security of MILSPECS and MILSTDS" and instead to take
advantage of commercial technology development, innovation,
and streamlining initiatives. The PM' s risk is one of
accepting and using unfamiliar commercial design and
development parameters. With commercial S&S come assumptions
about the conditions and tasks under which the product must
perform as well as the intended purpose of the standard. The
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S&S may be unique to a particular company, product, or process
and not easily transferrable.
The specifications and standards risks consist of
either choking the NDI process with required MILSPECS or
relying on CIDs for products, parts, and spares which may or
may not match MILSPEC and MILSTD detail. The implicit
understanding of combat environments and conditions may also
be lost. The grasp of military operational conditions in
commercially- oriented S&S may be foregone. Competitive
reprocurements that depend on CIDs as technical data package
references may jeopardize functional and technical performance
in the field. This in turn depends on the PM being equipped
with a detailed market analysis that examines the suitability
of CIDs to meet user and system* requirements.
A shrinking DTIB is one trend DOD witnessed after
winning the Cold War. Stemming this trend is potential dual-
use (military and civilian) item applications. Defense-
commercial product usage enables more flexibility in
procurements, closes the gap between military and commercial
products, and keeps the DTIB competitive in the global
marketplace (Gansler, p. 115, 1993) . Yet the defense
industry, like the acquisition workforce, is resistant to
these opportunities (Mandel, p. 193, 1994). Dual-use and
commercial specifications in this post -Cold War era are
becoming more suitable for meeting the level of detail
required for military requirements. But despite their
political popularity, commercial market practices,
specifications, and production standards continue to be a hard
sell (Schrage, p. B3 , 1994).
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d. Test and Evaluation
Test: and evaluation (T&E) programs for NDIs must
achieve the same purpose as developmental T&E programs: to
define risks. This risk functions to consider how a system
meets its functional specifications in the intended
operational environment. The T&E risks in NDI acquisitions
are: testing away NDI time and cost savings for the sake of
testing and risk elimination; incomplete or inadequate design,
development, production, and logistics support T&E by both the
contractor and PM due to the pressures of an accelerated
acquisition (Cain, p. 24, 1993); or assuming the contractor's
T&E results are sufficient and merely conducting technical
reviews of T&E data (Garcia, p. 20, 1991) . Ineffective
verification of compliance with requirements and
specifications may result. For example, prototypes may be
proposed as competitive designs without sufficient production
and support facilities and activities. PMs who implement
streamlined NDI T&E programs and use T&E data reviews in place
of production and support capability evaluations (or at least
demonstrations) may be creating risks in their programs. NDI
T&E risks therefore, can contribute to technical performance
and supportability risk in the program.
NDI T&E programs are a form of risk management, not
risk elimination, used to prove technical capabilities,
operational effectiveness, and suitability. The T&E community
sees four areas of risk in NDI system testing:
1. Requirements may not be clearly understood.
2 . Definition of the operational environment may not be
clear and thus can't be tested with a level of
confidence.
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3 . Definition of system interfaces and operability
between the NDI system and others it must
interface/operate with may not be clear.
4 . Test documentation and support issues may not be
addressed in the test program.
Two impediments in the T&E community also exist:
1. The T&E "mindset" . The testers orient on traditional
developmental approaches and ignore non- traditional,
NDI T&E approaches tailored to a streamlined
acquisition strategy. This non- traditional approach
may require different .T&E methods, timelines, and
levels of detail.
2 . Lack of knowledge and experience with commercial test
practices and standards.
A streamlined NDI T&E program may introduce risks of
insufficient source evaluation, inadequate competition, and
incomplete market analysis. This may lead the PM to overlook
promising alternatives.
e. Integrated Logistics Support
"ILS in an NDI acquisition can be more difficult
because of the difference in an acquisition process" (DSMC NDI
Acquisition Guide, p. 41, 1992) . NDI integrated logistics
support (ILS) activities performed in DEMVAL and EMD are often
accelerated to ensure support arrives concurrently with the
item. ILS risks involve events that disrupt maintenance
planning, manpower, supply support, support equipment,
technical data, training and training support, mission
critical computer requirements, packaging/handling/storage/
transportation, facilities, and design interface of
operational capability with resources. The ILS issue becomes
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one of identifying what trade-offs, logistics-related
requirements, and departures from developmental ILS are
necessary.
A NDI acquisition strategy creates several ILS
risks. While real reliability and training data may be in
place, reduced lead time means less ILS planning time and time
to develop organic support. The ILS risk of proliferating
hardware and software changes (e.g. when DOD is unable to buy
the technical data rights for maintaining configuration
control of commercial items) can be significant. ILS risks can
contribute tremendous complications to NDI acquisition
planning and execution.
A PM develops an ILS plan (ILSP) in conjunction with
the NDI acquisition strategy. This outlines risk management
measures for supportability risks specified in the ILSP. A
NDI program's supportability objectives act as part of
functional requirements. Supportability risks may appear in
design by overlooking realistic operational conditions, RAM,
survivability, and test equipment required. NDI
supportability plans may not be included in Government
requests for contractor proposals (RFPs)
,
bidding contractors'
responses, and as NDI source selection criteria. ILS risks in
NDI competitive proposals may include neglect of warranties,
data rights, and best value procurements.
The type and level of support affects the severity
of impacts ILS risks have in an NDI acquisition. The user and
PM may not clearly decide whether to use organic support,
contractor support, or a mix of both in the ILSP as interim
and longterm measures. Trade-offs may not be included in this
decision. The decision should be incorporated into the
overall acquisition strategy. Decisions on the level of
repair affects spares and repair parts requirements. The
sources of supply are also at issue.
The rapid availability of NDIs might outpace their
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logistics support structure in the field. An accelerated
acquisition cycle may overpower training, maintenance, and
logistics support activities for a new item. The NDI product
may lack sufficient detail and realism in commercial training
support, training equipment and documentation. Test and
evaluation data on design, performance, and logistics support
may not be complete or available. Supply items may lack the
necessary lead time to support fielding and new equipment
training. Reduced commonality and standardization accompanied
by increased manpower and support requirements may actually
add costs over the product's lifecycle (Vandeviere, p. 15,
1994) . Configuration control may be complicated by rapid
obsolescence (Cain, p. 24, 1993). This then jeopardizes
component integration and interoperability as components and
parts are repeatedly being replaced. The supplier may cease
production of the item which creates a problem for spares
availability and proliferation of models. This reduces
material readiness by creating incompatibility of system
components. The item may require contractor maintenance
support in an operational environment.
To summarize, NDI requirements, acquisition management
environment, S&S, T&E, and ILS risk issues will challenge
users, PMs, and potential contractors. The challenge will be
to balance benefits in NDI acquisition costs and schedules
with technical performance, programmatic, and supportability
risks. Common threads tying NDI program objectives and risks
together will be teaming among the acquisition community
members, addressing traditional biases, market analysis, the
clarity and stability of user requirements, and the ability of
the PM to cope with the accelerated features of a NDI
acquisition strategy.
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E. NDI ACQUISITION POLICY
The risk management portions of DOD and U.S. Army
acquisition policy and instruction are thorough. The NDI
sections are treated likewise.
1. DOD DIRECTIVE 5000.1
DODD 5000.1 "requires the use of an existing U.S. or
allied military or commercial system be assessed and
thoroughly reviewed as an approach to satisfy a need or
requirement. The directive also states that when tailoring an
acquisition strategy to meet individual circumstances,
consideration should be given, whenever possible and
appropriate to maximizing practical use of commercial "off-
the-shelf" (COTS) products" (PM Notebook, p. 1.5. 1-1, 1992).
2. Government Policy
The National Defense Authorization Act of 1987 "requires
DOD to use NDI to fulfill needs to greatest extent possible.
It also requires that DOD state its need in terms of functions
to be performed, performance required, or essential
characteristics" (PM Notebook, p. 1.5. 1-1, 1992). This bill
followed the 1986 Packard Commission's report which proposed
that (President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense
Management, 19 86)
:
DOD should make greater use of components, systems,
and services available off-the-shelf. It should
develop new or custom-made items only when it has
been clearly established that those readily




The commission's recommendation to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition was to require PMs "to receive a
waiver before using a product made to military specifications
if there is an available commercial counterpart".
F. IMPLICATIONS OF RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY FOR NDI ACQUISITION
PROGRAMS
The paths of risk management policy and NDI policy do not
cross. DOD policy emphasizes both risk management and NDI but
in differing directions. Risk management policy in the 5000.-
series keys on developmental items and acquisition strategies.
NDI policy focuses on its risk mitigation features gained
through use of established commercial alternatives. Cost and
schedule benefits aside, no description or instruction for
risk management in an NDI program appears in the 5000 . -series
.
Risk, risk management, and NDI subject area searches using the
Air Force Acquisition Model (AFAM) supplement 1.4 dated 1
December 1993 revealed no matches between the three subjects.
This policy void exists within the expectation that the
PM will "tailor" the risk management approach to NDI much like
the acquisition cycle is tailored to NDI. Tailoring is
accepted as overlapping, combining, or omitting elements of
the acquisition process (DODI 5000.2, p. 2-6, 1994). A NDI
acquisition strategy is a tailored version of the
developmental acquisition process according to the type of
program, program risks, user requirements, and needs.
Tailoring NDI acquisitions according to program risks,
however, is not accompanied by risk management guidance or
instructions in either DODD 5000.1 or DODI 5000.2.
NDI cost, schedule, performance, supportability, and
programmatic objectives entail certain opportunities and
risks. Today, these risks must be managed without official
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guidelines because DOD and the Army, though quick to embrace
NDI benefits, have not followed their enthusiasm with updated
policy. Dual -use technologies, NDIs, and COTS items are
popular, in fact mandated, as the first alternative for
filling user requirements. Policy is needed that recognizes
the increased use of commercial technologies for military
applications and their corresponding risks.
The risks in NDI acquisition are not as widely described
or documented as the benefits. The absence of documentation
and description is due to lack of familiarity with the NDI
acquisition risks in competitive, commercial (defense and non-
defense related) industries by PMs, users, and DOD policy
writers. These commercial market industries provide DOD with
a growing number of NDI systems not initially developed to
meet a military need. The acquisition community's lack of
familiarity means a lack of comfort or confidence in
commercial practices and standards. This then creates
mistrust and inhibits defense -commercial interaction. Without
formal risk management policy and guideline initiatives by DOD
acquisition participants, definitive policy and instruction
has insufficient support or momentum to be officially
implemented.
In NDI programs, probabilities of adverse events and
their consequences in requirements, the acquisition management
environment, S&S, T&E, and ILS significantly impact the
achievement of program objectives. PMs need more explicit
guidance in policy and instruction regarding NDI risk
management in the streamlined, accelerated NDI environment.
1. NDI Requirements. Policy does not address how
requirements generation and formulation during the NDI Concept
Exploration and Definition phase creates risk and how it
should be managed. Requirements and expected capabilities are
not compared to what is realistic and commercially available.
Market analysis, investigation, and surveillance are not
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adequately considered as part of the risk management process.
2. Acquisition Management in the NDI Environment. The
claim "this is the way it's always done" captures the typical
resistance inherent in the developmental perspective often
used by PMs , users , and DTIB contractors . Risk management
policy describes none of the interrelationships between the
acquisition environment and its participants: PM, user, DOD,
commercial vendors of NDIs, and Congress. Constrained
resources, competitive pressures, extensive oversight, and
constant change create continuous friction. These frictions
can make it difficult for DOD's PMs, users and commercial
representatives to work together effectively toward evaluating
trade-offs and satisfying user needs. The milestone reviews
and in- progress reviews of a NDI program lack risk management
guidelines for examining risk management effectiveness.
Measures of effectiveness and . measures of performance are
absent for NDI risk management.
3. NDI Specifications and Standards. CIDs are
unfamiliar ground to much of the acquisition workforce.
MILSPECS and MILSTDS provide a "comfort level" to PMs telling
the contractor specifically what to do and how to do it.
Managing risks inherent in the use of CIDs as opposed to
MILSPECS and MILSTDS is an unknown because extensive
consultation with DTIB manufacturers on technical performance
is relatively new. Existing risk management policy does not
accommodate well the loud voice that the DTIB must have in
establishing performance S&S for NDI items. To the contrary,
under existing policies, DOD and its PMs have grown accustomed
to being the dominant voice in such matters.
4. NDI Test and Evaluation. T&E is a part of risk
management, specifically risk assessment and analysis. Risk
management for NDI T&E risks overlaps with requirements, the
NDI acquisition environment, and specifications risks. DOD
policy does not spell out guidelines for managing risks in NDI
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testing methodology, scheduling, or integration with other
systems in operational environments.
5. NDI Integrated Logistics Support Planning. The
greatest number of risks in fielding NDI involve
supportability . Risk management policy neglects the market
analysis of modification requirements, sustainment of
logistics and supply, and availability of the product and its
production operations over the typical 15-20 year defense
horizon. DOD policy overlooks risks in contractor versus
Army- run depots, buying upgrade/pre-planned product
improvement (P3 I) packages, spares, and technical data
packages. The "other sources of challenges are the standard
internal DOD processes which must be expedited or tailored to
accommodate an NDI strategy" (Vandeviere, p. 15, 1994). This
policy gap must deal with such issues as training development,
logistics and maintenance support, personnel management
systems, and military force structure planning.
6. SUMMARY
DOD and U.S. Army risk management policy provide no
explicit details or guidance on managing NDI -related risks.
DOD's shortfalls were described above. Similarly, the Army
has not addressed the growing NDI area with risk management
guidelines with which a PM could structure an NDI risk
management program. With the increasing level of commercial
products in DOD and U.S. Army inventories, it behooves them to
initiate policy and guidelines for NDI risk management
programs
.
The following chapter studies the efforts of the Army's
FAAD Sensors Program Office to manage the risks in its NDI
acquisitions and assemble a risk management program in the
absence of NDI risk management policy.
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IV. THE FAAD SENSORS CASE
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the risk
management program of an Air Defense Artillery NDI acquisition
program office. The chapter begins with a review of the ADA'S
critical early warning radar need upon retirement of the
Forward Area Alerting Radar (FAAR) . The review briefly
describes air defense doctrine and early warning radar
requirements. The chapter then introduces the Forward Area
Air Defense (FAAD) Sensors program which includes the FAAR's
NDI replacements, the Ground Based Sensor (GBS) and the Light
and Special Division Interim Sensor (LSDIS) . It explores the
risks facing the two systems. The chapter summarizes the PM'
s
overall risk management program and risk management plan. The
chapter considers how the programs' risks and risk management
may have resulted in the delays in fielding early warning
radars and the consequent ADA force readiness gap. The
chapter concludes with a look at the support provided by DOD
risk management policy to NDI system PMs as they structure
their risk management programs.
B. EARLY WARNING OVERVIEW AND FAAD ACQUISITION IMPLICATIONS
1. The FAAR and FAAD Doctrine
Early warning networks (EWN) support battlefield command,
control, communications, and intelligence decisions for FAAD
battalion commanders and Army division commanders. Early
warning radars making up the EWN provide continuous
surveillance, detection, acquisition, and tracking information
on potential air threats flying over an Army division's area
of operation. Ideally, the radars operate both day and night,
in all weather conditions, in both electronic countermeasures
(ECM) and anti- radiation missile (ARM) environments (GBS
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Acquisition Plan, p. 8, 1990).
Until 1990, the Army's ADA branch relied on the AN/MPQ-54
FAAR to provide its critical early warning information. The
FAAR early warning system consisted of an early warning van
with a telescoping radar pulled'by its prime mover, the Gamma
Goat. Air intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB)
and proactive air defense coverage depended on the FAAR to
continuously broadcast early warning of approaching threat,
unknown, and friendly aircraft. Without inherent early
warning capabilities in ADA battalions, the battalions' IPB
processes and fire units' combat effectiveness suffer. The
result of this lower effectiveness is a higher attrition rate
of prioritized divisional assets by enemy air threats as well
as increased incidents of fratricide.
The Army removed the FAAR from active service as of 31
October 1990 (LSDIS Acquisition Plan, p. 7, 1990) . The FAAR
was scrapped because it proved highly susceptible to ECM,
suffered from a poor operational readiness rate, and did not
cue ADA fire units effectively to approaching enemy aircraft
(Stolt, June 1994). The FAAR's Gamma Goat prime mover
experienced consistent maneuverability limitations. The
radar's range limitations impaired its survivability (in the
face of ARM) . The FAAR system had incompatible communications
configurations for digital radio transmissions and its design
featured no air-droppable capability (Wilson, August 1994)
.
No field- ready early warning replacement systems existed
for Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Divisional ADA battalions
deploying to the Persian Gulf either removed their FAARs from
"mothballs" for minimal early warning capability or deployed
without them. By the conclusion of the campaign, divisional
ADA units would be relying on "1940' s Eyeball Technology",
commonly called binoculars, as their organic EWN capability
(Tremmel, 1994) .
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Replacing binoculars with effective early warning radar
technology has become an urgent requirement for the ADA branch
and the Army (FAAD Sensors PMO, 1994) . ADA FAAD doctrine
depends on an effective early warning component to succeed.
FAAD doctrine integrates command and control nodes, fire units
such as Avenger teams and Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle,
and early warning radars to provide comprehensive FAAD
protection to forward deployed Army divisions. DOD and the
Army tolerate this EWN readiness gap while replacement radars
are tested and produced (Tremmel, 1994). The readiness gap
left by the retirement of the FAAR mandated an effective
defense acquisition program to fill the early warning need and
make FAAD doctrine viable (Tremmel, 1994).
2. Acquisition Implications
Past FAAD acquisition program difficulties and the FAAR's
problems have created an environment of high risk for future
programs and close DOD scrutiny for ADA branch PMs . FAAD
acquisition programs suffered a string of disappointments in
the 1980' s and early 1990' s. The Divisional Air Defense Gun
(the Sergeant York) , the Roland, the Air Defense Ant i- Tank
System, and the Fibre-Optic Guided Missile were all FAAD-
related programs that were cancelled due to inadequate
technical performance or high design and development costs.
The FAAD programs' reputation for expensive failures
combined with the FAAR's lifecycle maintenance and
supportability woes increases the danger of performance,
programmatic, and supportability risks. Any future ADA
acquisition to support FAAD, whether a weapon system or radar,
would also require close management of its cost and schedule
risks. This environment would dictate more substantial and
detailed FAAD Sensors program risk management.
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A lower- risk acquisition of EWN systems requires that the
PM recognize the Desert Storm' s* legacy. This legacy consists
of the expectations by DOD, Army, and Congressional
policymakers that the U.S. Air Force (as it did in the Gulf
War) will always maintain air superiority in any conflict.
The consequence of this assumption is that approval of major
defense acquisition programs and resource decisions would
neglect or discount air defense early warning as a justifiable
need that required and deserved funding. Given past FAAD
acquisition failures, their inadequate risk management
efforts, and arguments against the need for Army EWN, close
risk management is needed to prevent loss of program support
and to control possible environmental (political) risks.
This set of circumstances demanded that a successful EWN
acquisition program had to field long-term, operationally
effective, and suitable systems while effectively managing
risk. A streamlined and tailored NDI system acquisition which
met operational requirements and featured limited program
risks would be ideal for the situation.
C. TEE GROUND BASED SENSOR (GBS)
1. GBS System Overview
The FAAD Sensors PM manages the GBS as one of two systems
acquired to provide ADA its EWN capabilities. The AN/MPQ-64
GBS is a three-dimensional battlefield air defense radar which
employs a modern, phased array antenna for azimuth, elevation,
and range data for approaching air threats. It automatically
detects, tracks, identifies, and reports targets. It tracks
rotary and fixed- wing aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) , and cruise missiles. It classifies targets as fixed-
wing or rotary aircraft and differentiates air targets from
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ground targets. It provides cueing data and track updates
once every two seconds using digital communications to fire
units. Its 40km range allows it to facilitate target
acquisition beyond ordnance release lines to maximize fire
unit reaction time and engagement ranges. Its Identification
Friend or Foe (IFF) feature prevents fratricide by
interrogating aircraft in terms of their coded identity. It
tracks and searches for targets simultaneously (GBS Integrated
Program Summary (IPS)
, p. G-l, 1994)
.
The GBS is a NDI system. It is the AN/TPQ-36A Firefinder
radar modified for FAAD missions and requirements (see Figure
4) . It is manufactured by Hughes Aircraft Corporation. The
GBS features a proven system capability with extensive data
and support information concerning cost, schedule,
performance, and supportability program objectives.
2. The GBS Acquisition Strategy
The GBS mission need studies began in 1979 as part of an
automation-based, ADA force modernization initiative. FAAD
doctrine and a GBS acquisition strategy evolved from these
studies. The acquisition strategy emphasizes systems near or
ready for production. The requirement for a FAAR replacement
was approved by the Vice Chief of Staff, Army on 3 September
1985. The requirement established that fielding begin in
Fiscal Year 1991 employing an NDI sensor and common Army
hardware and software. The Milestone III Acquisition Decision
Memorandum approved the GBS NDI Acquisition Strategy on 19
August 1986 (GBS IPS, p. C-l, 1994)
.
The FAAD GBS Request for Proposal (RFP) was issued on 19
April 1988. Hughes was the only respondent. Candidate
evaluation tests proved its proposed AN/TPQ-3 6A radar did not
meet requirements. The solicitation was terminated on the
basis of unattainable performance requirements contained in
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Figure 4 The Ground Based Sensor (Source: FAAD Sensors
PMO, 1994)
the ORD. Minimum operational requirements were reassessed,
the GBS ORD was amended, and the new ORD approved by the Army
on 29 November 1989.
With relaxed requirements, the Army issued a competitive
resolicitation for GBS development contract bidders which
included a Source Selection Evaluation Test (SSET) . The SSET
consisted of proposal evaluations and field tests focusing on
both technical and operational requirements. The proposal
emphasized that the Government desired the "best value" GBS
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system to satisfy its requirements (GBS IPS, p. C-2, 1994) 4 .
Seven candidates responded to the new SSET contract
solicitation. The goal was a NDI sensor with reduced
Government development costs and a shorter development phase.
Hughes won the competitive evaluation and was announced as the
contract awardee in December 1991.
GBS development began on February 1992. Pre-production
sensors were delivered and pre-production qualification tests
(PQTs) were successfully completed as part of the program's
Phase I. The initial sensors met performance and operational
requirements in accordance with exit criteria. Phase II
testing, which concerns the integration of GBS with FAAD
command, control and intelligence (FAADC3 I) systems, Avenger,
and Man Portable Air Defense Stinger (MANPADS) teams will
continue until pre-production sensors are completed and
delivered in February 1996. GBS fielding will finally begin
in 1997 (GBS IPS, p. C-4, 1994).
D. THE LIGHT AND SPECIAL DIVISION INTERIM SENSOR (LSDIS)
1. LSDIS System Overview
The FAAD Sensors PM manages the LSDIS as the second of
the two systems being acquired for FAAD EWN capabilities.
Whereas the GBS is initially designated for ADA units
supporting armored, mechanized, and armored cavalry divisions,
4 Note: Best value is defined as "acquiring a production
ready system through full and open competition that best meets
the Army's needs considering cost, schedule, performance and
risks" (LSDIS Acquisition Plan (AP)
, p. 8, 1990). The best
value approach strives to meet Army needs by the product
itself or with a P3I program. It differentiates minimum
requirements from objective requirements. The contractor can
meet minimum requirements rather than objective ones. The
disadvantage is that the Government is not assured of ever
reaching those objective requirements.
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the LSDIS is dedicated primarily to ADA battalions in light
infantry, airborne, and air assault divisions and contingency
corps. The LSDIS is a two-dimensional air defense radar that
alerts fire units with azimuth and range data on approaching
short-range, low- altitude aircraft. It is a highly mobile,
lightweight, manportable system which detects and
automatically classifies fixed-wing and rotary aircraft up to
a range of 20km (see Figure 5) . It is an interim system until
a light-weight version of the GBS is fielded (no earlier than
Fiscal Year 00) (LSDIS Acquisition Plan, p. 7, 1990)
.
The LSDIS is a NDI system. It is intended to support
rapid- deployment light and special divisions in low- intensity
conflicts with early warning alerts of incoming threat
aircraft. It is classified as an urgent, directed procurement
to expedite its fielding (LEWDD Directed Procurement
Memorandum, p. 1, 1990)
.
2. The LSDIS Acquisition Strategy
The LSDIS NDI acquisition strategy consists of a
competitive procurement reflecting the FAAR's retirement,
pursuit of the best technology available, and minimizing
expected cost and schedule. The directed procurement "label"
originated from the urgent need to field an early warning
sensor to light and special 'division ADA units until a
lightweight version of GBS could be deployed.
The LSDIS acquisition cycle began with the approval of
the Lightweight Early Warning Sensors Required Operational
Capability (the LSDIS 's original ORD) on 22 June 1990 and the
Directed Procurement of the Lightweight Early Warning
Detection Device (LEWDD) Memorandum published 26 July 1990.
These were based on the technical requirements of the U.S.
Marine Corps LEWDD program. The directed nature of the LSDIS
procurement emphasized an accelerated solicitation and source
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Figure 5 The Light and Special Division Interim Sensor
selection process (LSDIS IPS, p. 4, 1993).
The FAAD Sensors PM recognized that not all system
requirements would be met. This was particularly true with
objective requirements. Proposal evaluations were based on
best value and considered tradeoffs between objective
performance requirements and current technical capabilities
(minimum requirements), cost, and schedule (LSDIS AP, p. 10,
1990) .
The LSDIS RFP was released on 30 July 1990. Lockheed
Sanders and Lear Siglar were the only bidders. The LSDIS
program emphasized a streamlined NDI approach that allowed the
Government to rapidly meet its urgent need. The competition
emphasized that bidders provide reduced cost, efficient, and
"best value" systems. Lockheed Sanders was awarded the best
value contract on 13 November 1990.
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LSDIS product testing began after the contract award in
May- June 1991. The LSDIS contract required a First Article
Test (FAT) and a PQT after which additional production
contract awards would be issued. The date of the first unit
(to be) equipped (FUE) was late 1992 with fielding to be
complete in 1994 (LSDIS AP, p. 7, 1990). The LSDIS FAT was
successfully completed during -1 July 1991-15 November 1992
with the PM conditionally accepting the first unit. The PQT
occurred from 2 March- 7 May 1992. The LSDIS failed to meet
operational requirements and system specifications due to
false target rates, reliability-availability-maintainability
(RAM) shortfalls, and azimuth alignment problems. A second
PQT initiated on 7 June 1993 revealed all shortfalls were
corrected and no further operational failures were exposed.
The contractor's inability to meet operational requirements
resulted in higher production costs and schedule delays of one
year (LSDIS IPS, p. 10, 1993).
The LSDIS NDI acquisition strategy required that
production begin only after successful PQT completion. The
LSDIS directed acquisition authorized limiting specification
standards, test plans, and contract data requirements in its
RFP as a means of saving costs. Waivers of those items
designated as non-cost effective contract requirements were
intended to shorten the program's duration. The acquisition
strategy stressed "streamlined" program planning, testing, and
ILS (LSDIS IPS, p. 10, 1993).
E. RISKS AND RISK PERCEPTIONS IN THE FAADS SENSORS PROGRAMS
1. 6BS Acquisition Program
a. Technical Risks
The revised requirements published in the GBS
resolicitation reflected the Government's best value approach.
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New minimum operational requirements allowed the contractor to
make tradeoffs in technical and performance capabilities. The
GBS design was simplified as a two- (azimuth and range only)
rather than three-dimensional radar to meet cost and schedule
objective requirements (Eison, 1994) . Warranties for
reliability and performance of accepted units assured
compliance with all minimum requirements. The PM rated GBS
technical risk as low to moderate for meeting minimum
requirements (GBS Acquisition Plan, p. 9, 1990).
The PM rated the risk of meeting technical performance
objective requirements broadly as being low to high. This
rating encompassed the known, current technical performance of
the radar (based on minimum requirements) while accounting for




The PM rated the GBS cost risk as low to moderate.
The GBS design was based on the Firefinder configuration which
initially reduces the development requirements and costs.
Schedule and performance risks are also dampened by the mature
design. The cost risk rating considers the range of possible
performance capabilities and contracting costs resulting from
a best value approach. Cost history and production experience
with the AN/TPQ-36A Firefinder indicate low cost risks in
production. The GBS PM used a Firm- Fixed- Price (FFP) contract
to contain Government cost risks. The PM's conclusion was
that a NDI acquisition strategy would procure the best
technology available. A reasonable contract price was
expected through the competitive bidding process (GBS AP, p.
10, 1990) .
The PM raised the GBS cost risk to moderate when the
P3 I program was added. These cost risks reflected research
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and development (R&D) and design modifications required to
achieve objective performance requirements. They also
consider a different contract type. Hughes Aircraft
Corporation would expect a Cost-*Plus contract to cover its R&D
costs and higher risks assumed in attaining higher objective
performance requirements. If Hughes or a competitor agreed to
a FFP contract (given that some P 3 I developments have existing
technological solutions) , cost risks would be lower for the
Government and moderate (rather than high) for the contractor.
GBS's objective performance requirements would be pursued
early in the acquisition cycle if additional funding were
approved for the GBS P 3 I program (GBS AP, p. 11, 1990)
.
c. Schedule Risks
The PM rated the GBS schedule risk as low for
meeting a two year delivery schedule for a first production
sensor upon contract award. Market surveys supported this
assessment. Surveys revealed the risks of late fielding due
to completion of a P3 I program increased schedule risks to a
range of moderate to high. The PM intended to pursue mature
technology as part of the P 3 I. Schedule risks involving the
completion of the longer- range P3 I program depended on the
increased technological complexity of the sensor and expected
costs to achieve those objective performance requirements (GBS
AP, p. 11, 1990) .
d. Supportability Risks
The PM's management of supportability risks is based
on acquiring a validated technical data package (TDP) . The
purchase of a TDP is intended to reduce risks concerning
future repair parts by Government ownership of technical
documentation. Future repair parts procurements could then be
56
competed to find adequate support contractors to provide
uninterrupted parts over the systems entire lifecycle (GBS AP,
p. 11, 1990) . No risk rating was assigned to system
supportability risks in the GBS Acquisition Plan. See Figure
6 for the GBS Risk Assessments.
2. LSDIS Acquisition Program
a. Technical Risks
The PM rated the LSDIS technical risk as low to
moderate. As with the GBS, the LSDIS program followed a best
value acquisition approach. This approach allowed the PM,
armed with market survey results, to compete the procurement.
However, LSDIS performance would be tested during sensor
production. The contractor would warranty reliability and the
fielded systems' performance after acceptance. Risk




The PM rated cost risk as low based on the LSDIS FFP
contract and competitive procurement strategy. LSDIS system
configurations represent low cost risk with existing cost
history and production background already established. Price
again was a factor in the best value approach to reduce the
Government's cost risks. Price considerations under a
competitive NDI acquisition strategy was not anticipated to
raise cost risk above a low rating (LSDIS AP, p. 11, 1990).
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Figure 6 The GBS Risk Assessments (Source: GBS IPS, 1994)
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c. Schedule Risks
The PM rated schedule risk as being moderate based
on the urgent and accelerated schedule. The contractor was
expected to meet LSDIS's directed procurement fielding dates
one year after contract award (LSDIS AP, p. 11, 1990).
d. SupportaJbillty Risks
No description of LSDIS supportability risks or risk
reduction measures is in the LSDIS AP. Support is rated as
moderate in the LSDIS IPS Risk Assessment. The 1990 LSDIS
Light Sensor Market Study did not address contractor logistics
support. See Figure 7 for the LSDIS Risk Assessments.
F. THE FAAD SENSORS RISK MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
1. FAAD Risk Management and DOD Policies
The FAAD Sensors PM believes NDI acquisition strategies
equate to risk mitigation (FAAD Sensors PMO, August 1994)
.
Both the GBS and LSDIS risk management programs demonstrate
the characteristics described by DODD 5000.1 and DODI 5000.2.
Both the GBS and LSDIS risk management programs outlined
performance, cost, and schedule risks. Supportability risks
are mentioned in passing. The FAAD Sensors PM used a
streamlined risk identification, assessment, and reduction
process as a risk management program. The GBS and LSDIS risk
identifications and ratings and their rationale are simple and
direct.
DODI 5000.2 does not explicitly outline a NDI risk
management program for NDI PMs . Army Regulation (AR) 70-1
makes no explicit connection between NDI and risk management.
No quantified or qualified risk analysis accompany the GBS and
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Figure 7 The LSDIS Risk Assessments (Source: LSDIS IPS, 1994)
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LSDIS risk assessments to explain how they were obtained.
Consideration of NDI- specific risks in requirements,
specifications, T&E, and ILS are" not evident. This is because
existing policy does not describe how specific a streamlined
risk management approach must be, let alone refer to any NDI-
specific risks. DOD policy provides no NDI risk management
references for NDI PMs to cite. Due to this lack of guidance,
NDI solutions to urgent needs and force readiness gaps can
lead to incomplete risk management programs. PMs may tailor
developmental item risk management guidelines and risk
assessments formats found in DODI 5000.2 and DOD 5000. 2 -M to
suit NDI program needs. However, tailoring developmental risk
management policies does not assure successful NDI risk
management
.
The NDI GBS and LSDIS programs constitute tailored,
streamlined acquisitions of mature technology according to DOD
and Army streamlining guidance. The FAAD Sensors PM' s risk
management practices incorporate tailoring and streamlining in
his simplified identify-assess-reduce structure. The GBS
acquisition strategy indicates that "the Army prefers to buy
systems already designed, developed, tested, and in
production, or at least where principal components are in
production" (GBS IPS, p.C-4, 1994) . Any risks involved with
such an approach are not covered in an Army policy or
memorandum, despite NDI's popularity in Army acquisitions.
DOD 5000. 2 -M does not outline a NDI risk assessment
format. The GBS and LSDIS risk assessment formats are broad
but follow the developmental risk assessment structure found
in DOD 5000. 2 -M. Any application of DOD 4245. 7-M risk
identification and assessment procedures to the indicated GBS
and LSDIS cost, schedule, performance, and supportability
objectives are tailored or overlooked. The DSMC Risk
Management Guide and the AFAM similarly do not cover NDI risk
management policy, plans, or risk assessment formats. These
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possible risk management references are not mentioned in the
GBS or LSDIS risk management documentation.
2 . The GE5 Risk Management Program
The GBS risk management program's risk descriptions in
its acquisition plan and risk assessments in its IPS meet
minimum DOD policy requirements. The GBS risk management
program uses the DOD 5000. 2 -M risk assessment format. The
GBS's risk management program meets policy requirements by
articulating risk planning, assessment, and reduction
measures.
The PM implemented technical risk reduction by using a
two-tiered approach to technical performance. The two tiers
are minimum and objective technical performance. A system had
to perform within this range to meet the Army's minimum
requirements. The GBS contract bidders would then be
considered as qualified potential candidates. The PM' s market
surveys indicated low risk of meeting the minimums. Higher
risk requirements were designated as objective or "desired"
requirements rather than setting them as minimums as in the
original RFP. Technical risk was reduced using testing during
source selection. Production contract options would not be
exercised unless pre-production systems completed technical
tests successfully. These measures reduced risks in fielding
production units which did not comply with warranties on
required performance levels (GBS AP, p. 10, 1990)
.
To meet objective or "desired" requirements meant the PM
had received funding approved for a GBS P3 I. The GBS P3 I
program is currently unfunded. This programmatic uncertainty
accounts for the GBS configuration changes to the HMMWV prime
mover (low risk) , radar hardware and software performance
modifications (moderate risk) , and future-based radar
modifications to support the GBS's projected role as a "common
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corps sensor" (GBS AP, p. 9, 1990).
The risk of publishing unattainable requirements in the
original solicitation created follow-on risks to GBS
performance, cost, schedule, and programmatic objectives. The
sole bidder to the original RFP, Hughes, did not meet the user
requirements during candidate system testing. Effective
market analysis may have revealed that the combination of
multiple systems' characteristics stated in the ORD did not
exist in any one radar configuration. A complete market
analysis could have indicated problems with the original
requirements in 1985.
The new ORD and resolicitation of the GBS contract began
four years later. The competition for contract award was not
completed until 1991. Six years in schedule were added. The
program management costs now included the resolicitation and
re -evaluation of candidate radars based on a new ORD. The new
schedule extended far beyond the retirement date of the FAAR
and a FAAD EWN capabilities gap developed. The GBS's
objective performance requirements now hinge on unfunded
product improvements. The impact is seen in the PM being
forced to trade off objective performance in order to expedite
fielding a radar with the minimum required performance
capabilities. The programmatic risks were realized when DOD
decreased production funding and the number of systems it
would buy from 77 to 57 in 1994 (Department of the Army ADA
Highlights Memorandum, p. 6, June 1994).
The GBS NDI acquisition strategy emphasizes the benefits
of NDI streamlining described earlier. Although minimum
performance requirements were met during SSET, the GBS best
value procurement did not meet all objective performance
requirements. The PM and user accepted technical performance
trade-offs. These decisions concentrated on performance that
maximized mission support of FAADC3 I and cueing FAAD weapon
systems rather than maximizing GBS radar performance.
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Deferred performance objectives may cause delays in procuring
GBS P3 I longlead items and eventually result in a production
stoppage
.
The problem with a production stoppage is that resulting
production line layoffs, retraining, facility overhead costs,
and start-up costs risk further schedule delays and cost
escalation to both the prime and subcontractors (GBS IPS, p.
C-7, 1994) . The traditionally low- risk NDI cost and schedule
features have also contributed to greater technical
performance and programmatic risks for the GBS program. The
PM was forced to "broad brush" the technical performance risk
rating based on the uncertainty created by an unfunded P3 I
program.
The FAAD Sensors PM currently waits for additional
funding approval to incorporate product improvements into the
GBS configuration. Without the improvements, the ADA branch
fields a minimum- capabilities system, delays procurement of
long- lead items, and faces possible production shutdowns.
With the improvements, the GBS schedule grows again, incurs
more costs spread over fewer systems, and ADA endures more
pressure to sell the program and justify its need.
The PM planned to reduce GBS cost risks based on the type
of contract awarded for both production and P3 I. Pre-
production and production contracts were FFP with performance
warranties. The contractor assumed the cost risks. The
Government could reject options that were too risky. A Cost-
Plus Incentive Fee award would be based on levels of proposed
performance compared to desired requirements (GBS AP, p. 11,
1990) . Cost containment decisions in not exercising product
improvement options and the use of a FFP contract limited
Government risk and enhanced program support in the short
term.
The PM' s schedule risk reduction effort relied on the
best value NDI acquisition strategy. Potential contractors'
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proposals considered production and delivery schedules. GBS
schedule risks were decreased by restricting production starts
until the completion of the pre-production program. This risk
reduction measure had its own drawback, however, of extending
the program's length over an unacceptable period of time (GBS
AP, p. 11, 1990)
.
Supportability risks were assessed with limited depth.
The Firefinder radar has a previously established support
structure, supply and parts channels, and a training support
package. While these could be tailored to the GBS fielding,
support, parts flow, and training programs must be oriented to
FAAD missions and roles.
Risk minimization by the FAAD Sensors Program Office
considered other components besides objectives. The best
value competitive acquisition strategy incorporated proposed
contractor risk reduction measures into the source selection
evaluations and contract proposal evaluations. The PM' s test
program includes a logistics demonstration in conjunction with
operational testing to verify ILS capabilities and support
concepts.
3 . The LSDIS Risk Management Program
The LSDIS acquisition program's risk descriptions in its
acquisition plan and risk assessments in its IPS meet minimum
DOD policy requirements. The LSDIS risk management program
generally follows the DOD 5000.. 2 -M risk assessment format.
The waiver of non- statutory requirements (due to its urgent
and directed procurement classification) reflects the more
simplified and less detailed risk assessment structure.
The PM employed a LSDIS technical risk reduction effort
similar to the GBS program. The Army's performance
requirements spanned the range of essential requirements and
desired capabilities. Minimum performance requirements
consisted of capabilities and characteristics needed by the
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user. Capabilities described in contractor proposals that
exceeded the basic requirements were considered objective
performance requirements . The LSDIS contract awardee would be
selected based on the best value of a proven NDI capability.
This technical risk minimization complemented the production
readiness assessment during which the bidders would "prove
out" their production units in actual demonstrations. The
production assessment would be reinforced by the FAT and PQT
(LSDIS Acquisition Plan, p. 11, 1990)
.
Risk reduction in the LSDIS acquisition concentrated on
technical and cost risk. Schedule risks, although classified
as moderate, were accepted based on the urgent, directed
procurement. The limited quantity and urgent procurement
classification allowed maximum use of waivers for all
nonstatutory requirements (LSDIS Acquisition Plan, p. 12,
1990)
.
The LSDIS requirements risk evolves from the use of
Marine Corps requirements . The LEWDD Memorandum which served
as the basis for the LSDIS requirement was followed by a short
market analysis but, like the original GBS solicitation, drew
only one bidder, Lear Siglar. With competition and best value
common themes in NDI acquisitions, the contract was amended to
include a competitive procurement and interoperability with
FAADC3 I at the direction of the Army Acquisition Executive
(LSDIS Quick Report, 1993) . These changes delayed the
solicitation, added competition factors (which Lockheed
Sanders then won, largely on the merit of its proposal (Eison,
1994) ) , and entailed greater market analysis of contractor
testing and support capabilities.
Test and evaluation and specifications and standards
risks surface with the emphasis on an urgent LSDIS NDI
procurement. The directed procurement streamlined and waived
certain aspects of the program and its documentation. The
accelerated LSDIS acquisition program conducted performance
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and design testing after contract award rather than during
candidate evaluations. This did not allow for verification of
system performance, production capabilities, or support
structures until after manufacturing began. Once testing did
begin, the contractor's design did not meet specifications
during PQT. Operational requirements were not met.
Integration and interoperability with FAADC 3 I were also
overlooked in the requirements.- Integration with the other
components of FAAD battalions emerges as a performance
specification issue as well. Market analysis with greater
depth may have preempted these shortfalls.
The LSDIS NDI acquisition management environment entailed
greater risks than anticipated. Test and evaluation,
specifications and standards, ILS, requirements, and NDI
acquisition planning were streamlined to meet cost and
schedule objectives. LSDIS technical performance has
suffered. Despite the streamlining steps, which were well
known to all LSDIS acquisition participants, the contractor's
product difficulties caused schedule slippage and cost
increases. The short term gains will be justified only if the
amended portions of the LSDIS acquisition cycle do not return
to haunt the PM. The LSDIS remains fully funded for 40
sensors (Department of the Army 'ADA Highlights Newsletter, p.
April, 1994)
The urgent nature of this NDI procurement, similar to the
GBS, required more strict risk management. The accelerated
NDI acquisition strategy jeopardizes the ease with which
program objectives are expected to be accomplished. Test and
evaluation and integrated logistics support plans may be
rushed to completion for the sake of cost and schedule
objectives. The verification of performance and support
requirements in accordance with pre -determined specifications
and standards may become paper drills rather than evaluations.
Market analysis may also be caught in this compressed
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acquisition cycle, and critical performance, production, ILS,
and program issues may be overlooked.
4. The FAAD Sensors Risk Management Plans
The FAAD Sensors PM did not publish risk management plans
for either GBS or LSDIS . A risk management program does not
imply the existence of a explicit risk management plan (RMP)
to outline the program. Risk planning, as required by DODD
5000.1 and DODI 5000.2, does not require a PM to release an
RMP. The decision is left to the PM. Tailoring a NDI
acquisition strategy to meet program requirements allows the
PM to forego a published RMP. Tailoring, however, leaves a
program vulnerable to NDI -specific risks in requirements,
ILSP, T&E, S&S, and the NDI acquisition management
environment. These contribute to risks in its cost, schedule,
performance, and supportability objectives.
The absence of DOD or Army NDI risk management policy or
outlines leaves the burden on the PM. The DSMC's proposed RMP
outlined in its Risk Management Concepts and Guidance
publication assumes a developmental program application. It
neglects the risks and risk management needs unique to the NDI
acquisition program. The AFAM likewise overlooks the needs of
NDI PMs implementing risk management policy.
Assistance to NDI system PMs in the form of NDI risk
management templates, sample NDI RMPs, and specific DOD and
Army NDI risk management policy would facilitate NDI risk
management practice. These measures would also counteract
PMs' inclinations to treat risk management in their NDI
programs as a costly, time-consuming, non-value added effort.
The desire to tailor and streamline developmental risk
management policy rather than work with explicit NDI risk
management guidance leaves the PM free game to auditors,
evaluators, and stakeholders in a NDI acquisition environment
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that may grow less forgiving. The NDI templates and RMPs
would serve as readily available tools to quickly and
effectively assemble productive risk management programs that
successfully grasp and control NDI risks. Improved DOD and
Army NDI risk management policy would reinforce their
legitimacy.
The ADA'S FAAD doctrine depends on EWN. The FAAR
retirement generated a credible mission need. The need was
approved by the Army. Requirements were specified to meet the
urgent needs. The Gulf War highlighted the pursuit of timely
system fielding (programmatic risk) . However, the original
GBS requirements were not well written and reflected
insufficient market analysis into available early warning
radar technology (requirements and market analysis risks)
.
The GBS and LSDIS NDI early warning radars provided
initially attractive solutions to ADA'S FAAD and force
readiness gaps. Early operational assessments, SSETs, FATs,
and PQTs, however, uncovered weaknesses in both sensor designs
that confirmed best value for the Government but did not yield
desired performance (T&E and technical risk) . The accelerated
acquisitions had rushed the "limited" research and development
process to meet urgent fielding requirements at the expense of
confirmed, commercially-validated requirements and performance
risk "multipliers" in T&E, S&S, and ILS
.
6. SUMMARY
The GBS and LSDIS risks are described by the PM in terms
of cost, schedule, performance, and supportability.
Assessments and analysis of these risks are restricted to
outlines since no RMP is used for either program. This is
understandable in light of the DOD and Army policy voids and
NDI tailoring flexibilities. The problem is that a "pick and
choose" policy environment frustrates a PM' s definitive
efforts to build an effective risk management program and to
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write an explicit RMP. The pressure to buy NDI and ramrod
commercial specifications and standards into contracts will
only result in more tailoring and streamlining of RMPs.
Urgent and best value labels put on acquisition programs will
continue the RMP and risk management tailoring trend in NDI
acquisitions. The cost and time required to staff RMPs will
only be justified when better tools, policies, and incentives
exist to prepare detailed risk management programs.
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V. MERGING THE TWO PATHS INTO ONE
A. PURPOSE
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze DOD risk
management policy as it stands and to propose changes that
support NDI acquisition programs. The FAAD Sensors risk
management lessons learned appear first in this chapter. The
importance of these lessons is reinforced by examining the
risk management policy and the lack of detail it provides
concerning NDI. The chapter introduces a dendritic diagram
that breaks down developmental and NDI risk management
requirements. It then considers improvements to portions of
DOD risk management policy concerning NDI risks. NDI risk
management tools are offered that can help PMs in managing
risks in their NDI acquisition programs. It includes the
potential benefits in NDI risk management templates, risk
management plans (RMPs) , and 'watch lists. It looks at
possible revisions to the steps in the NDI acquisition cycle.
The chapter concludes with a summary of where policy and
procedure changes will expedite and increase the value of NDI
risk management programs and plans
.
B. FAAD SENSORS LESSONS LEARNED IN RISK MANAGEMENT
Several lessons can be gained from the FAAD Sensors
program in the realm of risk management. The FAAD Sensors PM
manages the GBS and LSDIS NDI programs using DOD's
developmental program-based risk management policies. The
FAAD Sensors program risks are categorized by cost, schedule,
and performance objectives. Supportability risks are briefly
mentioned. Programmatic risks are not specified. The PM uses
DODD 5000.1, DODI 5000.2, and DOD 5000. 2 -M risk management
guidance in managing his NDI programs
.
In both the GBS and LSDIS programs, the Acquisition Plans
(APs) identify risks, rate them, and describe risk handling
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and reduction. Risk assessments are furnished in the
programs' Integrated Program Summaries (IPS) according to DOD
5000. 2 -M formats. The NDI acquisition strategy in itself is
viewed by the PM as risk mitigation. With these risk
management program characteristics established, the following
lessons emerge:
1. The FAAD Sensors PM relied on developmental program-
based risk management policy direction and instruction because
no explicit DOD NDI risk descriptions, risk management
policies, or risk management tools such as NDI risk templates
exist.
2. The PM tailored and streamlined DOD risk management
policy, risk assessment formats, and risk management tools to
meet the demands of his NDI programs' needs. While executing
his risk management duties prescribed by DOD, the PM is
vulnerable to second-guessing by auditors and other critics
because specific NDI policy references that could be useful to
justify risk management decisions and actions do not exist.
Tailored risk management practices and streamlined risk
management documentation are acceptable in NDI DOD acquisition
management . This is true provided the PM' s risk management
process does not break down. In an era of constrained
resources, smaller RD&A budgets, and significant pressures to
contain risks and buy NDIs, unsuccessful NDI risk management
programs spell program failure. More explicit NDI risk
management policy would protect programs if it required
structured risk management planning in the form of an RMP.
PMs could also protect the validity of their risk management
efforts by using and referencing templates, program- specific
watch lists, risk models, or some combination of these tools.
Thus, the PM could have a safety net while walking the NDI
risk management high wire, with references and justification
for risk ratings, assessments, and handling measures.
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3.
The GBS and LSDIS IPS risk assessments rate the
majority of risks low while their APs describe risks in ranges
(generally low to moderate) . The lack of consistency might be
related to the difference in publication dates of the
documents that guided these assessments . GBS and LSDIS APs
published in 1990; the GBS IPS in 1994; the LSDIS IPS in 1993.
In NDI program management such as with the FAAD Sensors case,
the PM introduces programatic risk by classifying more than a
few program risk areas as moderate or high. NDI hold the
reputation of being low risk, and to rate risks otherwise may
draw audits, criticism, more documentation and meetings, and
unwanted stakeholder involvement. Uniformity of program risk
reviews prepared by contracting officers in APs that then
translates directly to the PM' s risk assessments in IPSs
reduces the need for such scrutiny.
This uniform treatment of program risks and the plans to
manage them could be most appropriately gained through a
published RMP which serves as a focal point for all risk
management issues and actions. A published RMP can be easily
referenced by IPSs and APs. The PM' s RMP could then bind AP
and IPS risk management material together. This
decisionmaking support tool could remain as an available
program management document from one milestone decision review
to the next. Its proper use would require training and
education in NDI risk management planning. Examples (see
Figure 8 and 9) are shown on the accompanying pages.
4. The FAAD Sensors PM does not consider NDI sources of
risk that could potentially affect successful achievement of
cost, schedule, performance and supportability objectives.
Requirements, NDI Acquisition Management Environment, Test and
Evaluation, Specifications and Standards, and Integrated
Logistics Support risks acute in NDI acquisitions are not
recognized or anticipated in any GBS or LSDIS IPS or AP. This
is because such risk areas are only now being identified.
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Figure 8 Proposed DSMC Risk
Management Plan Format (Source:
DSMC Risk Management Concepts
and Guidance, Chapter 4, 19 89)
Although there may be evidence of these risks in the two
systems' test and evaluation master plans, systems engineering
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master plan, and integrated logistics support plans, these
considerations are not cross -walked with AP and IPS risk
documentation
.
These lessons are not cited at the FAAD Sensors PM' s
expense. They are learned with his help. Previous FAAD
programs such as the Sergeant York, the Roland, and Air
Defense Anti-Tank System were doomed by inadequate risk
management programs whereas the GBS and LSDIS programs are
consistent with what DOD risk management guidance requires in
print. The FAAD Sensors NDI acquisition approach is
consistent with the DOD SD-2 Buying NDI Guide which specifies
market analysis, requirements development, solicitation,
source selection, product assurance (specifications) , T&E, and
ILS procedures (Office of the Secretary of Defense for
Production and Logistics, 1990) . Any trade-offs made in
staffing a tailored, streamlined NDI risk management program
versus other program requirements is not the focus of this
thesis. However, the FAAD Sensors case, like the SD-2 and
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other DSMC and DOD publications', does communicate the impact
of NDI sources of risk and their consequences in terms of
fielding delays, performance shortfalls, cost increases,
supportability concerns, and programmatic challenges (e.g.
funding shortfalls that reduce the number of systems to be
fielded, unfunded P3 I, the push for CIDs over MILSPECS and
MILSTDS) . The ADA user community has as much impact on the
control of these risk events as the PM. The PM's user has an
obligation to effectively research and validate system
requirements that directly affect its divisional tactical
doctrine, force readiness, and potential combat capability
gaps.
C. THE DIVERGING PATHS
The crux of the NDI risk management issue is that no risk
management policy explicitly addresses NDI acquisitions. Risk
management and NDI policy do not converge. DODD 5000.1 and
DODI 5000.2 invite tailoring of their risk management policies
to fit the needs of the individual programs. The implicit and
somewhat erroneous assumption in these policies is that risk
management is practiced for developmental programs with
complete acquisition cycles. NDI programs do not correspond
to these assumptions. DOD policies neglect NDI risks and risk
management practices.
NDI acquisition risks are unique. They reflect
accelerated, sometimes urgent procurements with abbreviated
acquisition cycles to meet user needs and requirements. NDI
acquisitions tailor and streamline acquisition policy and
particularly, risk management policy, and make tradeoffs among
program objectives. While NDI programs do mitigate risks in
cost and schedule, their technical performance,
supportability, and programmatic risks are heightened. The
consequences of risk events in these areas can have tremendous
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affect on cost and schedule in the long run. DOD's challenge
is to bridge the gap between developmental acquisition risk
management policy and practices and those that apply-
specifically to NDI risks. Effective application of NDI-based
risk management policy and practice can save PMs valuable
time, money, and manpower resources while assisting them in
effectively meeting program goals and objectives.
Risk management programs and NDI solutions are popular
acquisition issues whose paths must cross to serve the best
interests of NDI PMs, their programs, and their customers. At
present, however, the two paths lack any formal policy
connection. The point is not to invite more regulation, but
instead to appeal for official documentation and guidance that
corresponds with today's acquisition environment and its
emphasis on acquiring state-of-the-art technologies today as
sources of tomorrow's Army systems. By updating and
correcting the oversights in NDI risk management policy and
guidelines, PMs can more quickly and accurately assemble risk
management programs and concentrate on program objectives with
an appropriate NDI risk management baseline.
D. A DENDRITIC APPROACH
DOD risk management policy exists in DODD 5000.1, page 1-
4, and DODI 5000.2, Part 5B. The Army published its
acquisition policy with references to risk management in Army
Regulation (AR) 70-1. Its Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA
PAM) 70-2 on Risk Management is due in February 1995. Army
acquisition risk management policy implicitly corresponds to
and mirrors that of DOD. Army risk management policy
pertaining to NDI in AR 70-1 is not articulated despite the
popularity of NDI acquisitions and Army NDI initiatives. DOD
risk management policy according to DODD 5000.1 and DODI
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5000.2 relies officially on risk management tools such as
templates outlined in DOD 4245. 7-M and the AFAM and
unofficially with DSMC's risk management plans, risk matrices,
and watchlists found in its risk management guide. Army PMs
likely will tailor DOD guidelines for implementing risk
management to suit individual program needs.
A model such as a dendritic diagram can lay out the DOD
risk management issue, its scope, criteria, measures of
effectiveness and performance, and the rationale for NDI PMs
to have more explicit risk management policy. PMs could then
refer to NDI risk templates and other tools to facilitate
effective risk management.
Operational and design requirements, NDI acquisition
management, specifications and standards (for design and
manufacturing of standard and non-standard parts) , test and
evaluation (including FATs, PATs, and PQTs) and ILS all
represent significant NDI risk areas lacking templating in the
DOD 4245. 7-M and articulation in DSMC risk management plans.
A dendritic layout of risk management policies and the need
for NDI risk management guidance could be outlined as seen on
the following page in Figure 10.
E. DOD POLICY REVISIONS
NDI PMs currently conduct risk identification,
assessment, handling, and documentation according to DODD
5000.1 and DODI 5000.2. In doing so, the PM applies
developmental acquisition risk management policy and
procedures focusing on traditionally developmental program
risks to nondevelopmental systems. The point is that, as seen
with the FAAD Sensors PM, many NDI acquisition PM' s are forced
to "think on the move" without explicit directions or road
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Figure 10 Dendritic Diagram of DOD Risk Management Policy
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instructions, templates, or even unofficial emphasis in DSMC
risk management publications, PMs will continue to rely on gut
feelings, developmental lessons learned, and incomplete
references. The approach of tailoring and streamlining
developmental risk management policy and practice to suit NDI
program requirements puts NDI PMs and their acquisition
programs on a high wire without a net. Program risk
management can easily be second guessed because no official
references can be cited to justify risk management decisions.
Lack of published NDI RMPs increases this risk exposure.
1. DODD 5000.1 Risk Management Policy
DOD's Acquisition Policy Directive 5000.1, Part 1
contains no explicit guidance directed to NDI risks and NDI
risk management. The implicit developmental (as opposed to
NDI) tone in the risk management policy has not kept up with
the push to satisfy requirements using mature technology
acquisitions from Government agencies and/or commercial
sources. This necessitates risk management program
requirements and references directed to NDI PMs.
The DODD 5000.1 contains six areas which could be revised
to make its risk management guidance suitable for NDI PMs.
The first area is in the risk management section description
in Part 1. It presently states':
Program risks and risk management plans shall be
explicitly assessed at each milestone decision
point prior to granting approval to proceed into
the next acquisition phase.
This guidance lacks reference to a definitive risk
management planning structure. Currently, NDI PMs are
expected to tailor the DODD 5000.1 risk management guidance to
their NDI systems acquisitions. This leaves the PM's
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interpretations of present policy vulnerable to second-
guessing by auditors and program stakeholders such as the
Army. The following could be added for more structural
content to developmental and NDI risk management planning:
Every milestone decision point will include a
review of the updated risk management plan (RMP)
and measures taken to identify, assess, analyze,
handle, and document program risks. Continuity
will be maintained between the RMP and discussions
of program risks in the Integrated Program Summary,
Acquisition Plan, Systems Engineering Master Plan,
Test and Evaluation Master Plan, and Integrated
Logistics Support Plan.
The RMP would be modelled after the DSMC Risk Management
and/or DSMC Systems Engineering Management Guides' formats,
depicted in the DOD 5000. 2 -M, and tailored to the requirements
of the individual program. It would require the "teaming" of
the user and the PM to integrate a risk management focus with
needs and requirements development.
The second area is subsection a. which describes critical
parameters. This statement ignores the cost drivers in NDI
programs: requirements, NDI acquisition management , T&E, S&S,
and ILS. It directs the following:
a. Critical parameters that are design cost
drivers or have significant impact on readiness,
capability, and life cycle costs must be identified
early and managed intensively.
The DOD 4245. 7 -M describes the areas of risk that
jeopardize successful cost objective achievement. It does not
describe NDI risks acting as cost drivers. The following
could be added to reflect these NDI risks:
NDI programs shall include the effects of
requirements, NDI acquisition management, Test and
Evaluation, Specifications and Standards, and
Integrated Logistics Support risks on cost
objectives. Measures of effectiveness and
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performance for risk handling shall be proposed in
the RMP concerning these risks.
The third area of interest is subsection c. which
discusses Test and Evaluation. It reads:
c. Test and Evaluation shall be used to determine
system maturity and identify areas of technical
risk.
NDI acquisition strategies often include accelerated and
streamlined (depending on the quantity and quality of
contractor test data) testing and evaluation processes or
simply contractor test and evaluation data reviews. The risks
in NDI acquisitions are testing too little, too much, and the
right or wrong requirements. The following should be included
to address these concerns:
NDI market analysis of proposed designs, NDI test
and evaluation programs, and NDI performance
specifications shall not be subject to trade-offs
for the sake of short term cost and schedule
objectives. Such trade-offs introduce risks to NDI
lifecycle costs and support. NDI contractors' test
and evaluation data shall be screened and validated
independently by the -operational test and
evaluation community.
The fourth area is subsection d. which considers
contractor responsibilities. It directs that:
d. Solicitation documents shall require
contractors to identify risks and specific plans to
assess and eliminate risks or reduce them to
acceptable levels.
The reference to eliminate risks could be removed since
no program objective or action is free of risk. The shortfall
in this guidance on contractor risk management is the lack of
parallelism between the NDI PM' s risk management efforts and
requirements and those of the contractor. The NDI risk
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management efforts should emphasize teaming and sharing to
relieve the burden of risk management from resting primarily
on the Government. This is particularly true with the
accelerated nature of NDI acquisitions. Risk responsibility
should be shared by the contractor. The following could be
added
:
Contractor RMPs shall be specified in solicitations
as a deliverable. These shall be consistent with
DOD program managers RMPs . Risk sharing shall be
emphasized by the DOD- contractor team.
The fifth area focuses on subsection e. which discusses
the risk assessment format found in DOD 5000. 2 -M. The
guidance and format make no mention of NDI risks. Risk
assessments, while intended to be tailored, should be
comprehensive in nature and include the full spectrum of risks
expected as a NDI PM. The five NDI risks should be added to
the DOD 5000. 2 -M format.
The final area of revision is subsection f . which reads:
f. Schedule shall be subject to trade-off as a
means of keeping risk at acceptable levels.
The FAAD Sensors case demonstrates that trading off
schedule to control risk implies accepting force readiness and
doctrinal capability gaps. If no operationally effective
replacement systems exist, then such trade-offs can have
significant impacts on force training and combat
effectiveness. The following clarification could be included:
Such trade-offs shall be made only in the event
that current systems exist to sustain the force
until the NDI are fielded.
The DODD 5000.1 risk management policy revisions are an
important first step. Policy must clearly state the risk
management requirements and guidelines as they specifically
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affect a NDI PM' s risk management program. These changes will
provide impetus for revisions to DODI 5000.2 which will be
examined next
.
2. DODI 5000.2 Risk Management Policy
NDI PMs need more definitive and explicit policy and
procedures in DODI 5000.2, Part 5B pertaining to their risk
management programs. The DODI 5000.2, with its developmental
item orientation, neglects NDI risk management. With
increasing competition for shrinking DOD RD&A budgets and
resources, DOD and Congressional risk tolerance will decline,
pressure to manage programs according to sound business
practices will intensify, and "safer" acquisitions will
attract more support. In these circumstances, explicit NDI
risk management instruction will become critical to NDI
program management.
The two subsections in DODI 5000.2 could provide more
definitive risk management guidance to NDI PM' s and remove the
"guesswork" required in tailoring developmental risk
management policy. The first area is subsection a. No
mention is made of supportability and programmatic risks in
the reference to risk identification and control. These
objectives typically encounter many risks in NDI acquisitions
from risk events concerning requirements, NDI acquisition
management, T&E, and ILS . Supportability and programmatic
risks should be included in the discussion of acquisition
program risks
The DOD 4245. 7-M templates referred to in the policy as
a means of identifying and controlling risks are ten years old
and list risk areas such as funding that are not matched or
consistent with DSMC's five objective areas of risk. The
templates have no NDI-specif ic ^content . The five areas of
NDI risks should be explicit in the templates so that they
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correspond to NDI risk guidance in DODI 5000.2. DOD 4245. 7 -M
revisions will be discussed in the next section.
Subsection b. of DODI 5000.2 addresses industry
participation in risk management. Currently, there is no
explicit integration of contractor and PM risk management
efforts. A contractor RMP deliverable similar to the plan
published by NDI PMs binds the contractor to a risk management
partnership with the PM. It should document and update how
the program's risk identification, assessment, analysis, and
handling processes would be conducted. This uniform standard
would entail closer coordination or "teaming" of risk
management actions.
3. DODI 5000.2 Risk Management Procedures
Three areas exist in DODI 5000.2 risk management
implementation procedures that could better serve the
interests of NDI PM' s with more explicit discussion of NDI
risks. First, the instruction, "include clearly defined
criteria for elements leading to the risk assessment events. .
.
satisfaction of these criteria must be well documented to
support the rigor necessary in the risk assessment process"
highlights the policy void NDI PMs face in justifying their
risk ratings and assessments. DOD 4245. 7 -M serves as the
origin for the criteria described. Without existing NDI risk
criteria, risk assessments have no basis or references to
support them.
The second area of this procedures section concerns the
risk assessment format in DOD 5000. 2 -M. The format
description does more to encourage tailoring than to depict a
specific risk assessment format; it provides little to support
outlining an NDI risk assessment. The format would be more
consistent if it were to correspond to the risk areas listed
in the DOD 4245. 7 -M. Additionally, with NDI and streamlining
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initiatives more common today, more detail is required in the
supportability and programmatic sources of risk currently
described in those sets of templates.
Finally, milestone decision point reviews discussed in
this portion of DODI 5000.2 do not refer to one central
document as the basis for risk management data and
documentation of the planned risk management program.
Reference should be made to a RMP as the source of documented
program risks, risk assessments and analysis, risk reduction
measures, rationale, and assumptions in the published risk
ratings. This could be more effective than flipping between
the IPS, AP, TEMP, and SEMP.
Alternative acquisition strategies, particularly NDI
acquisition strategies, are often designed to mitigate certain
risks. NDI acquisition strategies account for degrees of risk
since they are based on procuring mature technology with
abbreviated RD&A schedules and costs. The policy here should
explicitly cite the NDI alternative, its streamlined
acquisition cycle, and the parts of DODD 5000.1 and DODI
5000.2 in which detailed descriptions of NDI risks and risk
management actions appear. For example, the following parts
of DODI 5000.2 could feature the NDI risks, possible risk
ratings and assessment considerations, and initial risk
handling options as deliverables: Part 4 (Requirements), Part
6 (Test and Evaluation) , Part 7 (Integrated Logistics
Support) , Part 9 (Specifications and Standards) , and Part 11
(NDI Acquisition Management) . Risks, particularly NDI risks,
could then be distinguished from developmental features in
each of these parts of the DODI 5000.2.
F. DOD 4245. 7 -M TEMPLATES IMPROVEMENTS
The following are areas for revision in DOD's primary
risk management tool, the risk templates. This would clarify
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DOD's position on NDI risks and recommended risk management
measures to the benefit of NDI PMs, their programs, and their
customers.
1. Requirements Risks
NDI risk management templates should begin with
requirements risk. Requirements risk should be identified and
assessed first, prior to considering a program's risks to its
cost, schedule, technical performance, supportability, and
programmatic objectives. Identifying and assessing
requirements risks controls its potential impact on technical
performance, cost, schedule, and performance specifications
from stalling an NDI program's early progress. NDI
requirements must include integration and interoperability of
the NDI with developmental items and the corresponding risks
of failing to effectively integrate and interface. An example
would be the risk of LSDIS not having interoperability with
FAAD command and control nodes and fire units such as Avenger
because that requirement was not concretely established.
Inserting market analysis into the acquisition cycle and
screening requirements development against what actually
exists in the market would limit unrealistic requirements
appearing in RFPs . The market analysis step should be
specified in policy as a step initially occurring between
preparation of the MNS and the ORD. This would facilitate NDI
solutions to user requirements and support sound NDI
acquisition strategy development based on a clear picture of
current industry technology rather than nonexistent, desired
capabilities of multiple systems blended together. The
category of NDI would also be clearly identified such that
source selection evaluation test results concerning assessment
of technical performance would not necessitate redesign and
recompetition of requirements and potential designs.
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2. Requirements Risk Template
AREAS OF RISK :
Operational and Design Requirements that are ill -defined
or overlook NDI alternatives.
Inadequate Market Analysis that contributes to "mix and
match technologies being required rather than verification of
what technology actually exists.
Tradeoffs in minimum and objective performance
requirements that fail to meet the user's stated need.
Improperly defining the proposed system's NDI category
and required design modifications.
OUTLINE FOR REDUCING RISK ;
1. Insert NDI Market Analysis into the acquisition cycle




Apply PM - user teaming to better screen and develop
requirements
.
TIMELINE : All Phases
3. Specifications and Standards Risks
NDI risk management policy should emphasize which
specifications and standards, CIDs or MILSPECS, that NDI
procurements will comply with. Secretary of Defense William
Perry is on record as requiring the use of commercial
specifications and standards rather than MILSPECS and MILSTDS
(Secretary of Defense Memorandum on Specifications and
Standards, p. 1, 1994)
:
Use performance and commercial specifications
and standards in lieu of military specifications
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and standards, unless no practical alternative
exists to meet the user's needs.
The DODI 5000.2 clearly states the waiver required to use
MILSPECS and MILSTDS over CIDs found in the Uniform Commercial
Code. DOD policy on technical risk reduction by using mature
NDI systems and their corresponding mature commercial
specifications and standards can assist PM' s and simplify
contractor compliance. Rather than specifications that
specify system, design, and manufacturing functions and steps,
the use of performance specs based on form, fit, and function
in place of the current "how-to" specs better suits mature
technology found in NDI. Such a change would facilitate
contractor responsiveness to RFP requirements and draw more
competitors to the bidding process. A larger sample of
industry alternatives, as witnessed in the re- competition of
the GBS contract and validated in SSETs, encourages
competitive systems and prices. Using CIDs would replace the
red tape NDI systems face in complying with developmental
MILSPECS and MILSTDS.
4. Specifications and Standards Risk Template
AREAS OF RISK :
Technical performance in commercial applications as
specified in CIDs may not equate to or explicitly meet
technical performance in military applications as stated in
MILSPECS and MILSTDS after an NDI acquisition strategy is
already approved.
Performance S&S based on form, fit, and function (that
allow contractors to design solutions) instead of the "how-to"
MILSPECS and MILSTDS used in design and manufacturing may
encounter workforce resistance or complacency.
Inadequate market analysis leads to accepting products
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with insufficient or undocumented technical data or CIDs with
which to re-compete the procurement for future buys.
OUTLINE FOR REDUCING RISKS ;
1. Specify in solicitations that CIDs for meeting user
requirements are a deliverable.
2. Evaluate the CIDs against MILSPECS to verify their
adequacy for design and development.
3 . Train and educate the acquisition workforce in CIDs
and commercial specifications.
TIMELINE : All Phases
5. NDI Acquisition Management
NDI acquisition management risks impact programmatic,
cost, and schedule objectives. NDI risk management policy
should redirect risk management responsibilities to be borne
primarily by industry, or at least equally shared. Since NDI
is mature technology, the developmental program risks assumed
by the PM and the Government no longer apply. With CIDs on
hand and effective market analysis verifying qualified
contract bidders, the RFP and SSET processes become much
simplified.
Changing developmental program paradigms to NDI remains
an acquisition community challenge. NDI alternatives can
become more acceptable to the acquisition workforce with
revised risk templates and detailed articulation of NDI risks.
Streamlining risk management paperwork requirements would be
best instituted by using RMPs and improved education. In
addition, delegating reviews of program risks to lower levels
of the acquisition chain of command would speed risk
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management actions.
The integration of civilian technologies into the
military demands that contractor risk management programs and
plans be explicitly required items in RFPs . NDI acquisition
management requirements mandates parallel NDI risk management
policy and references for both industry and PMs
.
6. NDI Acquisition Management Risk Template
AREAS OF RISK :
Despite streamlining, paperwork requirements, pricing
data, accounting requirements and continuous audits of NDI
programs stifle the cost and schedule objectives laid out in
the acquisition strategy.
Traditional developmental program attitudes and
developmental program "mindsets" continue to reflect a
cultural resistance toward implementing timely and cost-
effective NDI acquisition strategies.
Lack of PM- contractor and user-PM teaming on risk
responsibility and risk sharing hampers flexibility in risk
management efforts.
Programmatic micromanagement by stakeholders defeats the
benefits of an NDI acquisition strategy.
OUTLINE FOR REDUCING RISKS :
1. Require RMPs as a contractor deliverable.




7. Test and Evaluation
NDI Test and Evaluation risks impact performance, cost,
schedule, and supportability objectives. NDI risk management
policy must address the accelerated T&E program for validating
component and system performance in operational testing. An
NDI evaluation would be expedited with a test-fix-retest
(FAADS PMO, 1994) cycle rather than the extensive
documentation that goes into describing all the system faults
prior to a rescheduling a test. Technical performance and
design risks as well as confirmation of compliance with
realistic specifications and standards, requires more detailed
testing of the product and production process than implied in
the NDI mature technology "label".
8. Test and Evaluation Risk Template
AREAS OF RISK ;
Requirements are not stable, realistic, or well-
understood by designers, developers, testers, or managers.
Overtesting conducted despite the presence of
satisfactory contractor test and evaluation data package.
Developmental/technical testing costs are saved but
operational testing for operational effectiveness and
suitability may involve conditions not grasped by contractor
testing program. These incomplete tests and/or data may be
overlooked or unquestioned in the accelerated NDI acquisition
cycle and corresponding accelerated NDI testing program.
OUTLINE FOR REDUCING RISKS :
1. Test and evaluation data reviews of contractor
commercial testing program and results.
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2. Demonstrations of the contractor's testing process.
3. Test-Fix-Retest the proposed design on site to
expedite testing.
TIMELINE : All Phases
9. Integrated Logistics Support
NDI ILS risks affect cost, schedule, performance, and
supportability objectives. NDI risk management policy on
logistics planning risks entails the greatest need in improved
DOD guidance. The supportability risk of contractor
production and support operations terminating prior to a time
convenient to the Government, mandates that options be
specified in the ILSP and agreed upon by the PM and the
contractor.
Options the PM can consider include those posed in DSMC's
NDI Acquisition publication:
a. Buy commercial upgrades as they evolve and
become available.
b. Make a one-time mass spares purchase to sustain
the duration of the system's lifecycle.
c. Buy the technical data package to solicit
sources of supply that coincide with the end of original
production and support by the original contractor.
Market analysis should reveal whether contractor
technical data rights conflict with Government interests and
whether longevity of profitable production lines pose risks to
achieving supportability objectives. These should all be
points of direction in DOD policy.
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10. Integrated Logistics Support Risk Template
AREAS OF RISK :
Technical Data Packages may be unavailable or incomplete
which creates instability of spares and parts access.
Competitive re -procurements of parts may not contain
proper incentives to attract spares and parts vendors.
ILS and lifecycle focus may be overlooked during the
requirements development stage.
Use of military standard and non-standard parts creates
multiple parts and spares lines.
Depot/repair levels may not be defined in terms of
operational environments.
OUTLINE FOR REDUCING RISKS :
1. Define ILS requirements when deciding what category of
NDI the acquisition strategy involves.
2 . Conduct market analysis of contractor ILS
capabilities, ILS testing and support demonstrations
in the intended operational environment and
conditions.
3. Specify training packages and publications as a
contractor deliverable.
G. SUMMARY
The NDI areas described above require timely DOD
attention in DODD 5000.1, DODI 5000.2, and DOD 4245. 7-M.
These revisions are needed to adequately provide guidance to
NDI PMs . The template diagram, .the specific area of risk, an
outline for reducing the risk, and a timeline for managing
these risks within the system's lifecycle must be included.
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Clarifying the risk management policy and corresponding
templates with NDI implications would streamline the risk
management process in itself by saving time and effort to
staff who manage a risk management program. There would be no
need for NDI interpretation of developmental item templates.
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The subjects of risk management and NDI acquisitions are
attracting more attention today. The individual emphasis on
these two acquisition management areas is not matched by their
effective integration. As a result, NDI PMs are conducting
risk management programs that are themselves at risk due to
the lack of current, explicit guidance from DOD.
The practice of risk management does not benefit from
"cookbook" solutions. If such solutions existed for
developmental acquisition programs, there are very few, if
any, for NDI acquisition programs. This is the NDI PM'
s
dilemma. The NDI PMs must adhere to DODD 5000.1 and DODI
5000.2 risk management policies in their programs, but the DOD
material is vague or must be tailored to support NDI program
needs . The FAAD Sensors case is a testament to the PM who
drives a risk management program without the benefit of
signposts or road maps.
The NDI PM's challenges and program risks in the mid-
1990 's are not adequately reflected in DOD's mid- 1980 's risk
management policy, procedures, or tools. Risk management will
receive more, not less, emphasis as an explicit management
function. NDI and NDI acquisition strategies will continue to
grow in popular support as DOD RD&A budgets "downsize".
Modernization at minimum risk therefore will require properly
marked signposts and a good road map. It is time for DOD to
print and distribute those signs and maps.
B. CONCLUSIONS
NDI PMs continuously manage risk as part of today's
streamlined and tailored NDI acquisition environment. They
should expect and receive succinct, explicit policy and
guidelines to help them meet their risk management and program
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management goals and objectives. DODD 5000.1 could better
serve the NDI PMs with risk management language directed to
their specific type of programs and acquisition strategies.
DODI 5000.2 could provide NDI PMs with both better risk
management guidance and implementation procedures with NDI-
based instructions, formats (to be found in DOD 5000. 2 -M) ; and
tools (DOD 4245. 7-M risk templates and risk management plan) .
DOD 4245. 7-M could introduce NDI as a topic and an area
of templating as it is updated for today's acquisition
environment. The risks uniquely significant to NDI
acquisition programs can be better recognized, understood, and
managed with a focal point known as a risk management plan.
Several common threads bind NDI and NDI risk management
to immediate programmatic, performance, and supportability
objectives and long-term cost and schedule objectives. Those
threads are thorough market analysis, accelerated acquisition
cycles, and teaming of the risk management effort between the
PM and the contractor as well as the PM and the user. The
acquisition environment and its intricacies may be changing
but the demand for short -duration, cost-effective systems
acquisitions will persevere.
C . RECOMMENDATIONS
DOD should upgrade the DODD 5000.1, DODI 5000.2, DOD
4245. 7-M, and DOD 5000. 2 -M to incorporate the NDI risk
management issues and proposed revisions discussed in this
thesis. DSMC publications referring to risk management and
the AFAM should be similarly revised.
Market analysis, risk management plans, teaming, and NDI
acquisition training and education should be explicitly
emphasized in DOD risk management policy. Market analysis
should be specified as a deliberate step or phase conducted
immediately after the release of the Mission Needs Statement.
This may coincide with the Concept Exploration and Development
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Phase
. Risk management plans should be a required program
management and decisionmaking tool that is published as the
primary source of risk management program information such as
:
risks, risk ratings, risk assessments, risk analysis, risk
handling and/or reduction measures, and risk data
documentation. Other program plans would refer to the RMP as
the consolidated reference point for program risk information.
Teaming and education on NDI risk management should be
directives required of all PMOs
.
Risks in the following NDI sources of risk should be
explicitly cited and referenced in DOD risk management policy:
Requirements, Test and Evaluation, Specifications and
Standards, Integrated Logistics Support, and the NDI
Acquisition Management Environment. These sources create
uncertainty in the successful accomplishment of NDI program
objectives. They should be explored from both a NDI and a
developmental perspective (based on the needs and requirements
of the user)
.
DOD NDI risk management policy should stress RMPs, CIDs
(for review and comparison to MILSPECS) , Test and Evaluation
program data packages and demonstrations, and Integrated
Logistics Support Plans in NDI RFPs as contractor
deliverables. These should be required up front and early in
the accelerated NDI acquisition cycle and subject to frequent
review based on their immediate and long-term lifecycle
impacts on the system being acquired.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Market Analysis of NDI Requirements . The importance
of market analysis grows as DOD turns to the commercial
marketplace for more immediate solutions to its needs. An
analytical approach to evaluating NDI solutions is needed to
replace the market surveys of the past. This is more relevant
given the close ties and tremendous impacts well- or poorly-
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done market analysis can have on requirements generation,
selection of specifications and standards based on those
requirements, and comparison of contractor test and evaluation
results with those sought through DOD's developmental and
operational testing programs. Market analysis also plays a
significant role in determining contractors' ability to
support their products throughout their lifecycles. A case
study of NDI market analysis success story would prove
valuable as a reference or model to all acquisition community
players
.
2. Successful Contractor RMPs (in the Context of Best
Practices) . The case analysis of one or several success
stories in contractor risk management bears investigation,
particularly in the NDI environment. The lack of DOD emphasis
on risk management of NDI acquisition programs and supporting
RMPs may be mirrored by a lack of commercial emphasis on the
same area. Documentation of lessons learned in contractor
risk management plans could offer valuable insights to the
user community, PMs, and other contractors. Providing a
contractor "best practices risk management model" could




Risk Management in Foreign Military Sales and
Foreign Military NDI acquisition programs . The risks
encountered with acquiring NDI may represent only one category
of emerging acquisition issues facing DOD. Risks and risk
management practices in foreign procurements may have
similarities to NDI acquisition programs. This is especially
true with our national security strategy's increased focus on
economic security and global competitiveness. The DTIB's
vulnerability to not only national NDI alternatives but
international NDI may provide more justification for dual -use
products to improve competitiveness and mitigate RD&A risks.
The risks and risk management practiced in foreign acquisition
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programs will become more complex and may require more
detailed DOD risk management policy in foreign technology
acquisition programs.
4 . The DOD Developmental Acquisition Program Community's
Ability to Cope with the Rising Tide of NDI and Commercial
Practices. The cultural biases and mindsets towards
developmental programs described in this thesis must face the
rising tide of NDI much like the DTIB faces increased
competition for shrinking RD&A dollars. Changing attitudes
and program management paradigms in the acquisition community
has tremendous time, resource, and personnel implications.
Streamlining and tailoring the DOD acquisition process
emphasizes immediate, mature, and cost-effective NDI
alternatives. It may be important to examine the training and
education programs being used to facilitate NDI acquisitions,
NDI risk management, and acquisition community responsiveness
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